Re: [http-state] http-state charter
Bil Corry <bil@corry.biz> Fri, 31 July 2009 21:10 UTC
Return-Path: <bil@corry.biz>
X-Original-To: http-state@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: http-state@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id C98933A6AA4 for <http-state@core3.amsl.com>; Fri, 31 Jul 2009 14:10:54 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.735
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.735 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, HELO_MISMATCH_COM=0.553, HOST_MISMATCH_NET=0.311]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 5Mksg9X5kMOq for <http-state@core3.amsl.com>; Fri, 31 Jul 2009 14:10:53 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail.mindio.com (app1.bc.anu.net [193.189.141.126]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6C9383A6A76 for <http-state@ietf.org>; Fri, 31 Jul 2009 14:10:52 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (bcorry.anu.net [193.189.141.233]) by mail.mindio.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E2B6FC492; Fri, 31 Jul 2009 16:10:53 -0500 (CDT)
Message-ID: <4A735DD4.9040007@corry.biz>
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2009 16:10:44 -0500
From: Bil Corry <bil@corry.biz>
User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.22 (Windows/20090605)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Dan Winship <dan.winship@gmail.com>
References: <4A70D2D2.9050900@corry.biz> <4A731FCC.5040102@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <4A731FCC.5040102@gmail.com>
X-Enigmail-Version: 0.96.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: "http-state@ietf.org" <http-state@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [http-state] http-state charter
X-BeenThere: http-state@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discuss HTTP State Management Mechanism <http-state.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-state>, <mailto:http-state-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/http-state>
List-Post: <mailto:http-state@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:http-state-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-state>, <mailto:http-state-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2009 21:10:54 -0000
Dan Winship wrote on 7/31/2009 11:46 AM: > On 07/29/2009 06:53 PM, Bil Corry wrote: >> Much delayed, but I'm now working on creating our charter. I've included >> a first draft below; it borrows heavily from the httpbis charter. > > I'm not sure that really works; httpbis was starting from a good spec > and trying to make it better. We're starting from either a non-existent > spec (real-world cookies) or a spec that does not reflect reality in any > way (RFC 2965), depending on how you look at it, so our tasks are fairly > different from theirs. I've rewritten the charter to the one at the end of this message. Specific changes to improve it are appreciated. > You said in a follow-up: > >> If this WG can produce an updated Cookie RFC that documents how >> cookies are actually widely implemented (including HTTPOnly), >> I think that would be an excellent start. > > As I understand things, we cannot do this as a revision to 2965, because > 2965 is Standards Track, and this new document would have to be merely > Informational, since we'd be documenting the existing lousy security > model and violations of the HTTP spec in real-world cookies, and that > would not be acceptable in a Standards Track protocol. > > So I think the goal should be to first produce an Informational RFC, > describing real-world cookies, and then either (a) have 2965 > reclassified as historical, or (b) write a second RFC obsoleting 2965 > and providing a new profile of Cookie/Set-Cookie usage that is both > acceptable to the IETF and compatible with existing usage. (So it would > end up being a lot more like 2109 then 2965.) Do you think we can skip the Informational RFC and jump straight to writing a RFC that obsoletes RFC 2965? >> I'd really like to eventually build a new type of cookie that >> incorporates security features that cookies today lack (such as >> having the Secure flag turned on by default for HTTPS unless >> explicitly made non-Secure). > > Or more generically, cookies shouldn't bake in the assumption that all > ports on a given host are part of the same "cookie domain"... > > But this is the sort of thing that would be tricky to add; you need to > encode the secure-by-default cookie in some way such that older browsers > would not be able to see it (since if they saw it, they would treat it > as insecure). But that would mean that either (a) the web site would not > work with older browsers, or (b) the site would have to also separately > encode the information in some way that the older browsers could use it > too, in which case there is no reason to also use the new encoding. So > this runs the risk of turning into Set-Cookie2 again. I don't have any answers here, just the end result I'd like to see. - Bil ----- Charter: HTTP State Management Mechanism (http-state) WG Last Modified: 2008-07-31 Mailing Lists: General Discussion: http-state@ietf.org To Subscribe: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/http-state Archive: http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/http-state/current/maillist.html Description of Working Group: The HTTP State Management Mechanism (Cookies) was original created by Netscape Communications in their Netscape cookie specification, from which a formal specification followed (RFC 2109, RFC 2965). However, the formal specification was never implemented in practice; Cookie implementation evolved ad-hoc, creating a disparity between the formal specification and real-world usage. The working group will create a new RFC that obsoletes RFC 2965 and specifies Cookies as they are used in existing implementations and deployments. In doing so, the working group should consider: * Implementer experience * Demonstrated use of HTTP State Management Mechanism * Impact on existing implementations and deployments * Ability to achieve broad implementation. * Ability to address broader use cases than may be contemplated by the original authors. The following specifications, RFCs and Internet-Drafts should be considered: * Netscape Cookie Specification http://curl.haxx.se/rfc/cookie_spec.html * RFC 2109 - HTTP State Management Mechanism (Obsoleted by RFC 2965) http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2109 * RFC 2964 - Use of HTTP State Management http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2964 * RFC 2965 - HTTP State Management Mechanism (Obsoletes RFC 2109) http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2965 * I-D - HTTP State Management Mechanism v2 http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pettersen-cookie-v2 * I-D - Cookie-based HTTP Authentication http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-broyer-http-cookie-auth * Widely Implemented - HTTPOnly http://www.owasp.org/index.php/HTTPOnly Goals and Milestones: TBD No Current Internet-Drafts No Request For Comments
- [http-state] http-state charter Bil Corry
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Ian Hickson
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Prasad Shenoy
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Bil Corry
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Bil Corry
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Ian Hickson
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter =JeffH
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Daniel Stenberg
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Bil Corry
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Bil Corry
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Dan Winship
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Adam Barth
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Daniel Stenberg
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Bil Corry
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Dan Winship
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Ian Hickson
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Adam Barth
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Peter Saint-Andre
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Adam Barth
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Daniel Stenberg
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Adam Barth
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Daniel Stenberg
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Bil Corry
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Julian Reschke
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Pascal Gaudette
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Mark Nottingham
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Bil Corry
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Daniel Stenberg
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Dan Winship
- Re: [http-state] http-state charter Mark Nottingham