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Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution

"John Levine" <johnl@taugh.com> Sun, 13 March 2016 17:11 UTC

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Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2016 17:11:01 -0000
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From: John Levine <johnl@taugh.com>
To: ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution
In-Reply-To: <56E478F7.5070907@dougbarton.us>
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>Has anyone laid out the perceived dangers in an easily digestible 
>format? I would be interested to see that discussion.

See the discussion on this list in the first LC.  I tried to sum them
up in one message about a week before the end.

>Given that the DNS RR in question is something the end user has to 
>explicitly request, ...

Uh, what?  The DNS is under control of the domain owner, not the end
users.  If I'm running mitmmail.com, I can publish keys for all of my
users that I can decode on the way in.  If I'm that kind of MITM I
might even re-encode the mail with the users' real keys if I know what
they are, perhaps from the traditional PGP key servers.

This points out one of the problems with this draft: there's no
security model beyond the implicit DANE model that anything that's
signed with DNSSEC must be true.

R's,
John

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