Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Tue, 15 March 2016 02:01 UTC

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Subject: Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2016 22:01:22 -0400
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> On Mar 14, 2016, at 9:44 PM, Doug Barton <dougb@dougbarton.us> wrote:
> 
> Close behind that concern, the larger IETF community (or at least some very vocal segments of it) have serious concerns about this type of opportunistic encryption happening at all, or in my case, without user input. They (and to some extent I) remain unconvinced that your assertion that this type of opportunistic encryption is always better than the current state.

I would like to suggest that RFC7435 is a reasonable statement against the
all-or-nothing fallacy.

-- 
	Viktor.