Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution

[Doug Barton <[e-mail]>]

On 03/14/2016 08:18 AM, John C Klensin wrote:
> However, consider a different case.  Assume I have a message,
> whose content I consider sensitive, that I need to transmit to a
> party I know but with whom I have not corresponded by email
> before (and, therefore, Doug's "replying to message" case does
> not apply).   Now I don't need to send that by email.  I may
> have the post, fax, assorted courier services, reading it on the
> phone (PSTN or VoIP), transmission it by IM or text message, and
> other methods available to me.

In this scenario the PGP community has long (and I mean, for 20 years or 
so) advised to ring the person and confirm their key fingerprint (and by 
extension preferred e-mail address) over the phone. I don't see any 
reason why the existence of a DNS mechanism would change that advice.

> [1] As an aside, if I've got a trusted way to obtain that
> fingerprint without using the DNS, I most likely have another
> way to obtain the key so I don't need this I-D and protocol.
> When that argument is reversed, some of the advantages of Doug's
> suggestion (somewhat similar to that of others, earlier) to put
> fingerprint (and maybe other) information in the DNS rather than
> the key itself become obvious.  But, if we are really committed
> to letting a thousand experiments bloom, that is not relevant.

Thanks!

Doug