Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution
John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com> Sun, 13 March 2016 18:54 UTC
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Date: Sun, 13 Mar 2016 14:54:03 -0400
From: John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com>
To: ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution
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References: <20160313171101.3215.qmail@ary.lan> <F4DDCAC0-ACDF-4FD9-978E-90F4349A0420@dukhovni.org>
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--On Sunday, March 13, 2016 1:48 PM -0400 Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> wrote: >> On Mar 13, 2016, at 1:11 PM, John Levine <johnl@taugh.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Given that the DNS RR in question is something the end user >>> has to explicitly request, ... >> >> Uh, what? The DNS is under control of the domain owner, not >> the end users. > > A misreading of the comment. The "end-user" in question is > the one doing the lookup, not the one whose key is published. > Paul is making no claim about how the published key got > there... I understood that, and I assume John L. did too. The problem, again, is that we are conflating several issues, including whether the right key is going to be found to correspond to a given address and whether and how it can be trusted. A problematic domain owner (and, unless the nominal domain owner is paying a lot of attention, a problematic registrar or other third-party domain administrator) can provide bogus, self-serving keys. "Making no claim about how the key got there" is almost certainty true, but that misses the point. The document more or less claims that, if one finds a key in the DNS associated with a particular mailbox string, then that key has some association with the person who owns/controls (not necessarily the same thing) that mailbox. -07 was actually more clear about the issues with that than -08 is, but neither goes far enough, IMO, in detailing the risks that the community perfectly well knows about. The requirement is still that the I-D be clear about either known risks, restricting the experiment to those who are very familiar with those risks and accept them, or both. john
- dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Stephen Farrell
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution E Taylor
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Stephen Farrell
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution John C Klensin
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution John C Klensin
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Doug Barton
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Paul Wouters
- Treat model (was: Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolut… John C Klensin
- Case distinctions as theoretical exercise (was: R… John C Klensin
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution John Levine
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Paul Wouters
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Paul Wouters
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Doug Barton
- Re: Case distinctions as theoretical exercise Doug Barton
- Re: Threat model Doug Barton
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Doug Barton
- Re: Case distinctions as theoretical exercise John C Klensin
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution John R Levine
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution John C Klensin
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Doug Barton
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Paul Wouters
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Paul Wouters
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Doug Barton
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Mark Andrews
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Warren Kumari
- Re: Case distinctions as theoretical exercise Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: Case distinctions as theoretical exercise John Levine
- Re: Case distinctions as theoretical exercise Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution Stephen Farrell
- Re: dane-openpgp 2nd LC resolution John C Klensin
- Hashing local-parts of addresses (was: dane-openp… ned+ietf