Re: [Perc] Last Call: <draft-ietf-perc-private-media-framework-08.txt> (A Solution Framework for Private Media in Privacy Enhanced RTP Conferencing) to Proposed Standard

[Sergio Garcia Murillo <[e-mail]>]

On 15/02/2019 0:19, Bernard Aboba wrote:
> "I don’t recall, and I don’t see anything in the notes or email 
> consensus call, that would suggest the consensus included anything 
> along the lines “it’s okay to let the js application have the media 
> keys.”
>
> [BA] The PERC framework document only mentions that the endpoint is 
> trusted, but does not go into further detail.  That detail becomes 
> important when attempting to understand the provable security 
> properties of PERC (e.g. what attacks are prevented, what attacks are 
> still allowed). As an example, if the goal is not only to protect 
> against access to cleartext media within the MDD, but also the ability 
> of endpoints to mis-use the cleartext media (e.g. to create "deep 
> fakes"), then it is necessary to restrict access to cleartext media 
> within the PERC application itself (e.g. no ability to record or even 
> modify cleartext media).  That goes beyond the "no access to media 
> keys in JS" dictum to "no access to cleartext media for any PERC 
> application, native or Web".  Once you've gone there, the distinction 
> between the problem solved by PERC and content protection technologies 
> begins to disappear.  Keep in mind though that technologies such as 
> EME are transport-independent - EME can be used when transporting 
> media over the SCTP data channel, for example.

Indeed. Any true end to end encryption for webrtc that must be 
integrated with IdP and isolated media streams IMHO.

Best regards

Sergio