Re: IETF mail server and SSLv3

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Thu, 04 February 2016 22:59 UTC

Return-Path: <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
X-Original-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 294671B3385 for <ietf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 4 Feb 2016 14:59:43 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id E2xGj_fmjsJR for <ietf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 4 Feb 2016 14:59:41 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mournblade.imrryr.org (mournblade.imrryr.org [38.117.134.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 67FF91B3384 for <ietf@ietf.org>; Thu, 4 Feb 2016 14:59:41 -0800 (PST)
Received: from vpro.lan (cpe-74-71-8-253.nyc.res.rr.com [74.71.8.253]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mournblade.imrryr.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4A313282C3D for <ietf@ietf.org>; Thu, 4 Feb 2016 22:59:40 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from ietf-dane@dukhovni.org)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 9.2 \(3112\))
Subject: Re: IETF mail server and SSLv3
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
In-Reply-To: <C9624BB55C713BCF83E4A552@7AD4D3FB4841A5E367CCF211>
Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2016 17:59:40 -0500
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Message-Id: <08CEE02F-74DF-4C5E-A116-AB66FD8516FA@dukhovni.org>
References: <F38A9FEF-7DBB-4F40-860E-6CB425E5EEE3@ietf.org> <sjmvb66r1st.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <20160204024001.GM19242@mournblade.imrryr.org> <C9624BB55C713BCF83E4A552@7AD4D3FB4841A5E367CCF211>
To: ietf@ietf.org
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3112)
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf/v66mI1PSbaAV0xG0LguN-zsL2YQ>
X-BeenThere: ietf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF-Discussion <ietf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ietf/>
List-Post: <mailto:ietf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2016 22:59:43 -0000

> On Feb 4, 2016, at 11:22 AM, John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com> wrote:
> 
>> I am quite comfortable at this time with a requirement of
>> better than SSLv3 for SMTP on the public Internet.
> 
> Unless there is a fallback to clear text, I am not.

Yes, of course with cleartext transmission in the absence of STARTTLS
support.  I had expected that would have been clear from context.

The point being that systems that are STARTTLS-capable are at this
point essentially without exception capable of TLSv1 or better.

My statement should have said "requirement of better than SSLv3 to
complete a STARTTLS handshake".  I am not suggesting that we've
reached sufficiently broad STARTTLS adoption to make it realistic
to end support for cleartext SMTP.

At https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/saferemail/
we see a very small positive slope in the percentage of TLS
outbound mail (~2% per year) and no sign of growth in TLS inbound
mail (I'm guessing the bulk email senders don't much care for TLS
and send more traffic on weekdays than weekends).

-- 
	Viktor.