Re: [Iot-onboarding] [Secdispatch] DANE IOT proposed outcome

"Panwei (William)" <william.panwei@huawei.com> Mon, 16 November 2020 14:46 UTC

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From: "Panwei (William)" <william.panwei@huawei.com>
To: Eliot Lear <lear=40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
CC: "iot-onboarding@ietf.org" <iot-onboarding@ietf.org>, "secdispatch@ietf.org" <secdispatch@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [Iot-onboarding] [Secdispatch] DANE IOT proposed outcome
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Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2020 14:46:16 +0000
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Subject: Re: [Iot-onboarding] [Secdispatch] DANE IOT proposed outcome
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Hi Eliot,

I understand there should be something unique to identity the device, it can be the certificate or public/private key pair or something else. I think the use of DANE in IoT scenario is to bind the device identity, i.e., the certificate or public key, to the DNS domain name.
In the BRSKI mechanism, after the device (pledge) and the network (registrar) authenticate each other, the device will apply for a local certificate from the network. What I mean is that the network may don’t need to have the PKI system to sign a certificate for the device, instead, the device can generate a key pair and the network allocates a DNS domain name to be related to the public key. So, after onboarding, the device will have a DANE TLSA record, therefore it can use that to authenticate itself to the server.
In the case without certificates, DPP/POK can solve the onboarding phase, then some other mechanisms may also be needed to provision the DNS domain name to the device.

Regards & Thanks!
Wei Pan

From: Iot-onboarding [mailto:iot-onboarding-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Eliot Lear
Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 8:51 PM
To: Panwei (William) <william.panwei@huawei.com>
Cc: iot-onboarding@ietf.org; secdispatch@ietf.org; Eliot Lear <lear=40cisco.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [Iot-onboarding] [Secdispatch] DANE IOT proposed outcome

Hi Wei Pan,

I agree with you that there is a need for something that doesn’t require devices to have a full PKI built in.  But there needs to be something unique about the device that it can express and prove.  Also, we should separate out two problems:


  *   Proving the peer to the device
  *   Providing the device to the peer

Each has slightly different characteristics, especially when it comes to certificates.  Nobody should expect a huge cert store to be on a light weight client.  As was said in the chat, that is one thing that BRSKI solves.  But DPP/POK also solves it without certificates, but still requires at least a public/private key pair. Less than that I do not know how to work the problem.

Eliot


On 16 Nov 2020, at 13:02, Panwei (William) <william.panwei@huawei.com<mailto:william.panwei@huawei.com>> wrote:

Thanks to Eliot for summarizing these.

I think the core concept of using DANE in IoT scenario is to get rid of certificates and PKIX. The solution of how to securely onboard the IoT devices and allocate the DNS domain name, both with and without initial certificates, is the key part to figure out.
If the IoT devices have no initial certificates, such as 802.1AR IDevID certificate, as their initial identity, then the BRSKI mechanism won’t be appropriate for these devices because BRSKI has a requirement of IDevID.
If the IoT devices have an IDevID certificate, I think it can still use BRSKI to onboard, but it won’t use EST to request a certificate any more, instead, it will apply for a DNS domain name by using some protocols.

That’s my preliminary thoughts, maybe not right.

Regards & Thanks!
Wei Pan

From: Secdispatch [mailto:secdispatch-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Eliot Lear
Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 6:55 PM
To: secdispatch@ietf.org<mailto:secdispatch@ietf.org>
Subject: [Secdispatch] DANE IOT proposed outcome

Thanks to Shumon for presenting the DANE use case for IOT.

We discussed taking this to the iot-onboarding@ietf.org<mailto:iot-onboarding@ietf.org> list as there were a number of rather big open issues that people wanted to discuss.

We also discussed a non-WG forming BOF to look at, as Ted put it, the broader context for onboarding.  To give people a feel for the sort of related work that is available, here are a list of related activities:


  *   draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra (BRSKI) is a request/response mechanism that uses RFC 8366 vouchers to introduce devices and network infrastructure.
  *   Intel’s SDO provides an application level introduction using vouchers as well.  This work has been taken up by the FIDO alliance.
  *   The Wifi Alliance has Device Provisioning Protocol (DPP) which does not attach to a global name space prior to provisioning having occurred, but does represent a minimum case (just public keys).
  *   draft-friel-eap-tls-eap-dpp borrows from DPP, intended mostly for wired use, where DPP is focused on 802.11 networks.
  *   There are a number of BRSKI related drafts by Owen as well, relating to cloud-based registrars.
  *   There is also work by Michael Richardson and Peter Van Der Stock on constrained vouchers.  That work is taking place in ACE.

Understanding the landscape might help us understand where DANE fits in.

Regards,

Eliot
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