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Re: IPv6 Anycast has been killed by LINUX patch in 2016 - who cares?

Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org> Mon, 09 August 2021 11:29 UTC

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Subject: Re: IPv6 Anycast has been killed by LINUX patch in 2016 - who cares?
To: Töma Gavrichenkov <ximaera@gmail.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, 6man WG <ipv6@ietf.org>, IETF discussion list <ietf@ietf.org>
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From: Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org>
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Date: Mon, 09 Aug 2021 12:29:24 +0100
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Töma Gavrichenkov wrote on 09/08/2021 11:47:
> A gigantic, gaping hole in my assertion and experience would be blown by 
> anyone who's ready to come up with an autonomous system architecture, 
> able to reliably process and mitigate stateful layer 7-enabled 
> (including combined vectors) DDoS attacks towards a layer 7 network 
> service with no (or, insignificant) impact to the legitimate users of 
> the service, with no particular scrubbing centers likely to overload 
> during the attack, without anycast.

no doubt about it, ddos mitigation without ddos mitigation design and 
infrastructure is not easy.

Nick

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