Re: [6man] Stable privacy addresses (upcoming rev)

Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com> Sat, 31 March 2012 12:50 UTC

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Date: Sat, 31 Mar 2012 14:27:28 +0200
From: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>
Organization: SI6 Networks
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To: Christian Huitema <huitema@microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [6man] Stable privacy addresses (upcoming rev)
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Cc: Ray Hunter <v6ops@globis.net>, "ipv6@ietf.org" <ipv6@ietf.org>
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On 03/31/2012 07:32 AM, Christian Huitema wrote:
>> If the regime controls the local-link, then as far as
>> address-tracking is concerned, you're toast. -- They could sniff
>> the network and log the address->MAC mappings, have RAs require you
>> to do DHCPv6 and then have DHCPv6 assign you a constant address,
>> etc.
> 
> The obvious solution is to randomize the MAC address, and I would
> definitely want to do that when visiting untrusted networks.

Or use an external card or even a different system, use it, and destroy
and throw away. :-)

In any case, as noted by Ray, if you're really into the aforementioned
"regime" situation, randomizing the mac address is probably *not* #1 in
your set of priorities.


> Of course, randomizing the MAC address is necessary but not
> sufficient. There are many other ways in which our computer leak
> information. DHCP messages, for example, contains names and other
> identifiers. Computers connecting to a network issue a flurry of DNS
> lookups that can make for good signatures. Etc.

Exactly. That's why I said that if the regime controls the local link,
then, for the most part "game over". - If they don't, you can usually
tunnel somewhere else.

Thanks,
-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: fgont@si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492