Re: Non-Last Small IPv6 Fragments

Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Sat, 12 January 2019 17:18 UTC

Return-Path: <tom@herbertland.com>
X-Original-To: ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BDBD1130F93 for <ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 12 Jan 2019 09:18:12 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.041
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.041 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_MED=-0.142, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=herbertland-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 9BFkqRyCOoIG for <ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 12 Jan 2019 09:18:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-qt1-x82e.google.com (mail-qt1-x82e.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::82e]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 34730130F91 for <ipv6@ietf.org>; Sat, 12 Jan 2019 09:18:10 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-qt1-x82e.google.com with SMTP id t13so22325118qtn.3 for <ipv6@ietf.org>; Sat, 12 Jan 2019 09:18:09 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=herbertland-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=sZN3u0FTTlfI5QTA+xG8/fgddx4QCO5ukEKF6mo8IIk=; b=lZml6f4rzhi6+OgIoIDR4B2FrRerAGA2wgPW4RGxPNQgfCyFMm36uEXB5+dAZadzRL S1DQ0It9/ykaQoWosZ+BGEmc0Sp6onbxWdmIsHSEapY8LHLLBWvdjGsqrPLf2xvC4KpU RyKWogQBaY5G2EwSGiAeBqJEXgK2ij6p8e1Pd8rKuDjZON7+SbHT6nA/9VxgDLnnyf2r mo/WQ1I0GHltwMYF8gwVJj+j7mGlTQFTIkVmzZmWDzfSQfpRxGaTlbdce14HuQwTQiR0 D9KF57ofWgYuCd1X5ejRl/Wkp6Jv9lEY12/jeWBxCyVSpzo2/WSwLEf03TgJaQFe0B1o HR8Q==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=sZN3u0FTTlfI5QTA+xG8/fgddx4QCO5ukEKF6mo8IIk=; b=F77Yx+6OGT2m/iRy7+93sA36aomr7PAh+v38j5O5Myw/iqazHHH/OeaKSBpF9w+MoK KHimInBlJVYhC3uVC+PId9So7ily/klGHqwbkfpwg5FmHJ+tbelpLBvNjpAhb91ltK0s Sr955eOnTh3fuAenja4gQJI+W6Cvr8YBOjx83Kw9aOYL8rOo7ifqr1e0lz2EkmERuZXh IWGVe3w84p8qtHhmI/8nX6Nm3ATZt3x/TgRp2d2ZSgj8n7JKO0ZXY7po6gtdSfbc/uMa bgJpbuqXO3bsCxqWyENYrvoiRLrEMkLpG7we9XLKNb90Hfy+DQ2Fg3s5/Fl9+UKNQu7o uzOg==
X-Gm-Message-State: AJcUukcMXcHR5IYV5tEZ7R057Crapb7/niVKym15fMN6sLcjVXtrYvzK 6A3JB/6o2V4aHT4d0ZVqahcK+OiPTlLtjIJjBlEJsCiB66M=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: ALg8bN6xgyIkIeMGLFuGOoCbvnBWDFNSR6rnTRsezgvkCYdYSK5qHrlGqWmVraN1nj+OTd+IVu0mMxV0nbBOn17vo8Q=
X-Received: by 2002:a0c:f584:: with SMTP id k4mr18415838qvm.22.1547313488956; Sat, 12 Jan 2019 09:18:08 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <CAOSSMjV0Vazum5OKztWhAhJrjLjXc5w5YGxdzHgbzi7YVSk7rg@mail.gmail.com> <BYAPR05MB4245B9305E6EC57EDD45509FAE840@BYAPR05MB4245.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> <7453645f-ff91-e866-b087-e7d4f1450ab6@gmail.com> <0e792b48-4360-6977-9ae8-9cdfdc78c7b8@gmail.com> <16A642DC-D3A4-452C-B7D1-20CA0EEEDDA2@lists.zabbadoz.net> <CAOSSMjWS9po2XuBHJ5hbN9hfNDKZ1diecH08Kt697-15jRtAvg@mail.gmail.com> <0e0c3141-889e-ff60-2787-2889b3a9af6b@si6networks.com> <748DA428-5AB2-4487-A4FB-F2DABF5BF8BE@thehobsons.co.uk> <8b43af81-1c49-5cea-6472-97703674e661@si6networks.com> <CAN-Dau1HwG5RndacpSA+si+zKuTdpSvA=QA1A11A==rMNe=4+w@mail.gmail.com> <CALx6S35KNhV2gFp9OdU+M1zy5WUuEAEvXkDXNDWWxi7uQ4e_cw@mail.gmail.com> <CAN-Dau0rTdiiF2SjByxcMG6nhPCEjUH2pYBCOeK_FSGJ_ucDQw@mail.gmail.com> <CALx6S34AyV9OpvnjQhQc56n5vfeVgU5Zd3kheP0g+XvsMbBV9g@mail.gmail.com> <1b2e318e-1a9f-bb5d-75a5-04444c42ef20@si6networks.com> <CALx6S37TJr++fC=pVoeS=mrO1fHc4gL_Wtu-XkVTswzs2XxXCA@mail.gmail.com> <9352bb4d-f4d9-ebc6-34f9-dcb2f3ec24f1@si6networks.com> <312A771E-9E5B-4E33-926F-EDF46C4CB925@employees.org>
In-Reply-To: <312A771E-9E5B-4E33-926F-EDF46C4CB925@employees.org>
From: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Date: Sat, 12 Jan 2019 09:17:56 -0800
Message-ID: <CALx6S36V7vrVyoTP0G6+S5XeFNB3KWS5UaNnVi20xogRERdCfg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Non-Last Small IPv6 Fragments
To: Ole Troan <otroan@employees.org>
Cc: 6man WG <ipv6@ietf.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipv6/dekjAxOkzObn_0zdbmhpfIIEG70>
X-BeenThere: ipv6@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "IPv6 Maintenance Working Group \(6man\)" <ipv6.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ipv6>, <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ipv6/>
List-Post: <mailto:ipv6@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6>, <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 12 Jan 2019 17:18:13 -0000

On Sat, Jan 12, 2019 at 1:49 AM Ole Troan <otroan@employees.org> wrote:
>
> Fernando said:
> > I agree with the above (please see the ref I posted to RFC6274, which
> > basically argues about this). HOowever, it is still not clear to me
> > what's the problem you are addressing by enforcing a minimum fragment
> > size. If you allow MIN_MTU/2, then you require first frags to be 640
> > bytes.. and teh attacker is required to send 640 as opposed to 60 bytes
> > or  so. Doesn't seem to be much of a difference to me.
> > And as noted by Bob, I still don't see what's the big deal with the
> > small fragments.
> >
> > There are some DoS attacks where you send a last frag and possibly a
> > first frag, and the implementation allocates a buffer that would fit the
> > rest of the missing fragments -- obviously exacerbating the problem a
> > bit. BUt still i this cases, the size of the first frag is not a big deal.
>
> In e.g. VPP limiting fragment size would not help at all.
> The scarce resource is number of available buffers. One fragment occupies at least one buffer regardless of how much smaller than 2K (default buffer size) it is.
>
> Mitigations against attack is highly likely to be implementation specific.
> As an example see:
> https://github.com/FDio/vpp/blob/master/src/vnet/ip/ip6_reassembly.c
>
> Default reassembly timeout is 100ms (constrasting that with the RFC 60s)
> Maximum consequtive reassemblies in progress is limited to 1024.
> And in other virtual reassembly algorithms we have also limited maximum allowed number of fragments in chain to 5.
>
Ole,

I don't know what the protocol requirements are for virtual
reassembly. Is there an I-D or RFC on this?

Thanks,
Tom

> Now, if we in the IETF think we can provide some guidance here, I will second Erik’s suggestion of getting more research.
>
> The packet traces I have looked at in the past, the majority of fragmeted packets looked like attacks. UDP port 80, DNS queries to “thisdomainnamewillgiveaverylongresponsepurelyforthepurposeofattack.org”,
> didn’t reassemble, 64K size… But it would be interesting to understand fragmentation behaviour in various parts of the network.
>
> - how long are fragment chains (both in packets and in time span)
> - ratio of out of order fragments
> - which applications use fragments
> - ratio of attack traffic using fragments
> - average/min/maximum sizes, same for numbers of fragments in chain
> - ratio of complete fragment chain following the same path in the network
> - ratio of fragments to total traffic
>
> Cheers,
> Ole
>
>
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------
> IETF IPv6 working group mailing list
> ipv6@ietf.org
> Administrative Requests: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6
> --------------------------------------------------------------------