Re: [IPv6] Requiring Tunneling - subject change

Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net> Thu, 28 March 2024 16:37 UTC

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From: Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>
Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 17:37:13 +0100
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To: Joel Halpern <jmh@joelhalpern.com>
Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>, Francois Clad <fclad.ietf@gmail.com>, "Pablo Camarillo (pcamaril)" <pcamaril@cisco.com>, SPRING WG List <spring@ietf.org>, 6man <ipv6@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [IPv6] Requiring Tunneling - subject change
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Hi Joel,

Let me very clear here.

I am not really proposing any changes. What is already standardized is
sufficient to address all issues raised.

All I was doing in those threads is to clarify what problem are we talking
about and how could it be fixed reasonably.

And yes I did read RFC6936 and it does seems to very well fit the subject
of concern few people are expressing.

To restate - if end SRv6 hosts have issues to connect due to checksum then
can encap the SRv6. Solved.

If we want to automate such fallback is a different topic and folks who
think such fallback should be automatic can start a separate thread.

The crux of the matter is that for 99.99% of deployments using today uSID
there are no issues.

Kind regards,
Robert

On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 4:46 PM Joel Halpern <jmh@joelhalpern.com> wrote:

> Robert, as far as I can tell, you are asking for a different change than
> any of the other proposals.  If I understand, you are proposing that even
> end hosts inside an SRv6 domain should encapsulate the underlying IPv6
> packet.  In order to help the chairs keep track, and tell if there are
> other folks who also support such a change, I have changed the subject line
> and ask that if there is more to say, people use this subject line.
>
> I look forward to comments from folks beyond Tom and Robert on this
> subject.
>
> Yours,
>
> Joel M. Halpern
> On 3/28/2024 11:40 AM, Robert Raszuk wrote:
>
> Hi Tom,
>
> Not really.
>
> RFC8200 defines an exception which is tunneling and says:
>
>          As an exception to the default behavior, protocols that use UDP
>          as a tunnel encapsulation may enable zero-checksum mode for a
>          specific port (or set of ports) for sending and/or receiving.
>          Any node implementing zero-checksum mode must follow the
>          requirements specified in "Applicability Statement for the Use
>          of IPv6 UDP Datagrams with Zero Checksums" [RFC6936 <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6936>].
>
>
> So in practice if we always tunnel SRv6 there is no issue.
>
> Even Andrew agreed with that :)
>
> Cheers,
> Robert
>
> On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 4:36 PM Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 7:46 AM Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net> wrote:
>> >
>> > Hi Tom,
>> >
>> > > because of SRH
>> >
>> > Ok I buy this that there are devices which do check checksum and are
>> not final destination of the packets  ... I was more talking about plain
>> forwarding devices (aka P routers). Then I doubt firewalls would be sitting
>> in the core of the networks.
>> >
>> > But let me come black to what I believe is the main disconnect.
>> >
>> > Why SRH would cause an issue ? I think there is claimed issue *ONLY*
>> with SRv6 packets which are not encapsulated - call it raw - sent by the
>> hosts which talk SRv6 and sent with more then one SID/uSID which may get
>> swapped on the way.
>> >
>> > Because only in those cases the destination address will be changing
>> while checksum of the tunnel header will not be zero.
>> >
>> > So what we should I think discuss are really B.1 and B.2.2 cases.
>>
>> Robert,
>>
>> The scenario that I'm talking about is really simple, and it's not
>> specific to segment routing.  If someone sends a TCP in an IPv6 packet
>> with no routing header then the convention is that the TCP checksum is
>> valid end to end. So if the addresses are changed in flight, like in
>> NAT, then we expect that some part of the packet covered by the
>> checksum is adjusted to offset the change. If a packet is sent in
>> segment routing without an SRH with EtherType 0x86DD then it IS an
>> IPv6 packet to the network so all the conventions and requirements of
>> IPv6 should be applied. IMO, if SRv6 can't maintain these conventions
>> and requirements then it should fork from IPv6 and use a different
>> EtherType.
>>
>> Tom
>>
>> >
>> > Francois, Pablo - could you comment on this how often do we see those
>> type of SRv6 deployments ? And also could you comment if operator who
>> enables SRv6 in the first place sees those checksum errors how difficult is
>> to address it ?
>> >
>> > Thx,
>> > Robert
>> >
>> >
>> > On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 3:29 PM Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 6:26 AM Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net>
>> wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> > Hi Alvaro,
>> >> >
>> >> > On this specific topic I think you have flatted it a bit too much.
>> >> >
>> >> > These are apparently the options on the table:
>> >> >
>> >> > A) Original packet get's encapsulated with IPv6 header
>> >> >
>> >> >       A.1 SHR is added to it
>> >> >
>> >> >              A.1.1. Regular SIDs are used
>> >> >              A.1.2  Compresses SIDs are used
>> >> >
>> >> >       A.2 SRH is not added to it
>> >> >
>> >> >              A.2.1. Regular SID is used as destination
>> >> >              A.2.2  Compresses SIDs are used in a container
>> >> >              A.2.3  Compresses SID is used
>> >> >
>> >> > B) Original packet get's send from SRv6 host (without encapsulation)
>> >> >
>> >> >     B.1 SHR is added to it
>> >> >
>> >> >              B.1.1. Regular SIDs are used
>> >> >              B.1.2  Compresses SIDs are used
>> >> >
>> >> >       B.2 SRH is not added to it
>> >> >
>> >> >              B.2.1. Regular SID is used as destination
>> >> >              B.2.2  Compresses SIDs are used in a container
>> >> >              B.2.3  Compresses SID is used
>> >> >
>> >> > So within all checksum related discussions so far it seems that the
>> only concern is about B.2.2 and perhaps B.1 however folks did state that if
>> there is SRH added there is no issue so I am not sure how the presence of
>> SRH fixes it.
>> >> >
>> >> > Maybe there was some assumption that presence of SRH mandates
>> encapsulation, but I do not believe this is the case for native SRv6 hosts.
>> >> >
>> >> > All in all I think it should be no business for transit nodes to
>> verify packet's upper layer checksum. I do not know if there is any RFC
>> which would describe what is an expected behavior for transit nodes or even
>> say that they MAY do it.
>> >>
>> >> Robert,
>> >>
>> >> I can go further than that. I believe that intermediate nodes have no
>> >> business parsing into the transport layer, and yet firewalls do that
>> >> all the time even though there is no standard RFC on it (I've asked
>> >> for someone to formalize the requirements of firewalls, but to no
>> >> avail). Validating the checksum in flight is an instance of this, and
>> >> there are devices that commonly do this in deployment. Protocol
>> >> specific checksum offload in NICs is one example. Also, if someone is
>> >> seeing checksum failures in their network, an obvious action is to
>> >> sample packets from routers in the path and look at the traces. If the
>> >> checksum is incorrect on the wire because of SRH then the operator
>> >> sees a whole bunch of checksum errors at the router, but has no way to
>> >> distinguish those packets that are actually good from those that are
>> >> bad.
>> >>
>> >> It's a long established convention in IP that the transport checksum
>> >> is maintained to be correct on the wire-- this is done in NAT by
>> >> adjusting the checksum directly, there's also checksum neutral NAT
>> >> that adjusts another part of the IPv6 header to keep the transport
>> >> layer checksum correct. IMO, deviating from this convention is risky,
>> >> not just to SRH packets but that can have collateral damage like
>> >> breaking the user's ability to debug bad links as I described above.
>> >>
>> >> Tom
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >> > Kind regards,
>> >> > Robert
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 1:06 PM Alvaro Retana <
>> aretana.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Focusing on the C-SID draft, some have suggested requiring the
>> >> >> presence of the SRH whenever C-SIDs are used. Please discuss whether
>> >> >> that is the desired behavior (or not) -- please be specific when
>> >> >> debating the benefits or consequences of either behavior.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Please keep the related (but independent) discussion of requiring
>> the
>> >> >> SRH whenever SRv6 is used separate. This larger topic may impact
>> >> >> several documents and is better handled in a different thread (with
>> >> >> 6man and spring included).
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Thanks!
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Alvaro
>> >> >> -- for spring-chairs
>> >> >>
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