Re: Comments on draft-ietf-kitten-krb5-gssapi-prf-03.txt

Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> Mon, 23 May 2005 23:13 UTC

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To: "Blumenthal, Uri" <uri.blumenthal@intel.com>
References: <3DEC199BD7489643817ECA151F7C5929012AA5E9@pysmsx401.amr.corp.intel.com> <20050523172407.GB27516@binky.Central.Sun.COM>
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Date: Mon, 23 May 2005 19:13:14 -0400
In-Reply-To: <20050523172407.GB27516@binky.Central.Sun.COM> (Nicolas Williams's message of "Mon, 23 May 2005 12:24:07 -0500")
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Subject: Re: Comments on draft-ietf-kitten-krb5-gssapi-prf-03.txt
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>>>>> "Nicolas" == Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com> writes:

    Nicolas> On Thu, May 19, 2005 at 01:58:18PM -0400, Blumenthal, Uri
    Nicolas> wrote:
    >> >>> That text does need some cleanup, and the real issue is
    >> that the GSS-API >>> can't enforce any limits on the useful
    >> lifetime of PRF output used for >>> cryptographic purposes.
    >> So, I propose replacing that paragraph with:
    >> >>>
    >> >>> Care should be taken not to exceed the useful lifetime of
    >> >>> GSS_Pseudo_random() output, particularly when used for
    >> cryptographic >>> purposes.  Specifically, applications should
    >> limit use of >>> cryptographic keys derived from
    >> GSS_Pseudo_random() output to the >>> original lifetime of the
    >> security contexts to which >>> GSS_Pseudo_random() is applied.
    >> >>>
    >> >>> That seems much more specific -- no handfuls, pinches or
    >> touches.
    >> >>
    >> >> I am much happier with the proposed text.  Does anyone else
    >> have any >> comments?
    >> >
    >> >I have no problem with adding that text, but it sounds like it
    >> addresses a >different problem than the paragraph Nico proposes
    >> to replace.  The >existing text appears to be concerned about
    >> the amount of data which the >PRF can safely be used to
    >> generate.
    >> 
    >> I like the above text (let it stay), but agree with Jeff - we
    >> need something else in addition. Could say something along the
    >> lines of:
    >> 
    >> Care should be taken not to exceed the amount of data that PRF
    >> can safely generate.
    >> 
    >> This amount naturally depends on the mechanisms used. :-)

    Nicolas> This is a consideration for mechanisms as much as for
    Nicolas> applications.

    Nicolas> Mechanisms should not allow the PRF to output more than
    Nicolas> is safe.


I'm not sure that this is true.  I think it is a system level concern
and like Uri's original text.


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