Re: [Last-Call] Last Call: <draft-gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations-06.txt> (Security Considerations for Transient Numeric Identifiers Employed in Network Protocols) to Best Current Practice

Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com> Thu, 17 December 2020 01:04 UTC

Return-Path: <fgont@si6networks.com>
X-Original-To: last-call@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: last-call@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 76C4E3A1337; Wed, 16 Dec 2020 17:04:47 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, NICE_REPLY_A=-0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ZLpZb4J8UbQa; Wed, 16 Dec 2020 17:04:43 -0800 (PST)
Received: from fgont.go6lab.si (fgont.go6lab.si [91.239.96.14]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5EB7C3A09AC; Wed, 16 Dec 2020 17:04:41 -0800 (PST)
Received: from [10.0.0.129] (unknown [186.19.8.47]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by fgont.go6lab.si (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CFBA0283C4E; Thu, 17 Dec 2020 01:04:37 +0000 (UTC)
To: Joe Touch <touch@strayalpha.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: last-call@ietf.org, draft-gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations@ietf.org
References: <CABcZeBPTk0zrm6iwJOiac6N7w_jYhtkoX3HeBci9tZ_Y8=uKVw@mail.gmail.com> <0FA1DBD3-8E38-4F0E-A8CC-725053B64CB8@strayalpha.com>
From: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>
Message-ID: <38ad33f9-3f79-dc3f-6919-b07fb5a499f4@si6networks.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 22:04:05 -0300
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.9.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <0FA1DBD3-8E38-4F0E-A8CC-725053B64CB8@strayalpha.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; format="flowed"
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/last-call/4HtjMHB8PEqriIciLEdh7sDmQCE>
Subject: Re: [Last-Call] Last Call: <draft-gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations-06.txt> (Security Considerations for Transient Numeric Identifiers Employed in Network Protocols) to Best Current Practice
X-BeenThere: last-call@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF Last Calls <last-call.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/last-call>, <mailto:last-call-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/last-call/>
List-Post: <mailto:last-call@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:last-call-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/last-call>, <mailto:last-call-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2020 01:04:47 -0000

On 13/12/20 19:47, Joe Touch wrote:
> 
> 
>> On Dec 13, 2020, at 1:54 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>>
>> My position is that modern practice is to design protocols that have encryption
>> (this is strongly encouraged by RFC 7258 and also is just what we're doing)
>> and this document neither (a) engages with that nor (b) provides particularly
>> helpful guidance for encrypted protoco
> 
> +1
> 
> I don’t like the idea of over-specification to provide partial privacy or security.

It's quite the opposite.

Our document requires specifications to spell out the interoperability 
requirements, because quite too often speficiations specify things they 
need not.

For example, the QUIC spec specifies sequence numbers start at 0. *That* 
is an over specification. Because sequence numbers need not start at zero.

We simply require that specifications spell out the interoperability 
requirements for their identifiers, that they do a security and privacy 
analysis for them, and that they suggest one possible algorithm that 
would be well suited to generate the IDs, such that every implementer is 
not left to solve the question "now, what the heck should I use to 
generate these identifiers?".

Thanks,
-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: fgont@si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492