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Re: [Last-Call] Last Call: <draft-gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations-06.txt> (Security Considerations for Transient Numeric Identifiers Employed in Network Protocols) to Best Current Practice

Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com> Fri, 18 December 2020 02:00 UTC

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To: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>, Joseph Touch <touch@strayalpha.com>
Cc: Last Call <last-call@ietf.org>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, "Iván Arce (Quarkslab)" <iarce@quarkslab.com>, draft-gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations@ietf.org
References: <CABcZeBPTk0zrm6iwJOiac6N7w_jYhtkoX3HeBci9tZ_Y8=uKVw@mail.gmail.com> <0FA1DBD3-8E38-4F0E-A8CC-725053B64CB8@strayalpha.com> <4c6de2b6-c79e-2c17-c977-cb183547f60a@si6networks.com> <4DD07928-5846-4C98-BEF8-C3F5C90E7955@strayalpha.com> <110716be-ae95-5454-196b-c3d0fe07e498@quarkslab.com> <BD355E75-C649-4992-BBBB-8776442C82FF@strayalpha.com> <e3d08da8-c9ba-a6c6-de0f-08bcd658f7aa@si6networks.com> <D2AEB60F-ABB7-4D10-B1C2-E134F786474E@strayalpha.com> <01EC88BD-53D7-40F0-BE1D-9C10329CC2FF@fugue.com>
From: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com>
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Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2020 23:00:08 -0300
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Subject: Re: [Last-Call] Last Call: <draft-gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations-06.txt> (Security Considerations for Transient Numeric Identifiers Employed in Network Protocols) to Best Current Practice
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On 17/12/20 20:39, Ted Lemon wrote:
> On Dec 17, 2020, at 6:35 PM, Joseph Touch <touch@strayalpha.com 
> <mailto:touch@strayalpha.com>> wrote:
>> What I want to avoid is breaking the potential for IoT devices to use 
>> these protocols simply because they can’t implement the approaches 
>> described here.
> 
> Hardware RNGs are pretty common in embedded devices nowadays. I don’t 
> think this is actually a practical problem, although I am curious to 
> know if you know of new hardware for which it would be a problem. I will 
> admit that ancient hardware might have trouble, but it probably won’t be 
> updated, given the state of the art at present, so I don’t think such a 
> device poses a serious problem.

Yeah, I would also be quite surprised for endpoints to be able to do 
encryption/authentication, but not be able to compute PRNG or a simple 
hash function. (since QUIC was raised as a document for which, somehow, 
our documents turns out to be problematic)


-- 
Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
e-mail: fgont@si6networks.com
PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492

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