Re: [Last-Call] [Gen-art] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-oauth-rar-15

Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com> Wed, 30 November 2022 23:09 UTC

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Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2022 17:08:43 -0600
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To: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Cc: gen-art@ietf.org, draft-ietf-oauth-rar.all@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, oauth@ietf.org
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From: Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
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Subject: Re: [Last-Call] [Gen-art] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-oauth-rar-15
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On 11/30/22 2:39 PM, Brian Campbell wrote:
> Thank you for the review Robert. And apologies for the very delayed 
> response. I think we had a bit of a volunteer's dilemma 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volunteer%27s_dilemma> amongst the 
> editors, which was exacerbated by some timing issues including 
> vacation and subpar communication amongst us. We'll get all the 
> nits/editorial comments addressed. Also the minor issues. Actually, 
> changes for those are already in a branch of the document source 
> repository 
> https://github.com/oauthstuff/draft-oauth-rar/tree/genart-review and 
> should be in the -17 revision. Some discussion on the majors is inline 
> below.
>
>
> On Thu, Nov 17, 2022 at 3:45 PM Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com> 
> wrote:
> <snip>
>
>     I have two major issues that I think need discussion:
>
>     Major Issue 1) The document seems to be specifying a new way of
>     comparing json names, claiming it is what RFC8259 requires, but I
>     disagree that RFC8259 says what this document is claiming. If I'm
>     correct, the document is trying to rely on the text in section 7 of
>     RFC8259 to support the idea that implementation MUST NOT alter the
>     json
>     names (such as applying Unicode normalization) before comparison and
>     that the comparison MUST be performed octet-by-octet. Rather,
>     section 7
>     says something more like "you better escape and unescape stuff
>     correctly
>     if you’re going to do unicode codepoint by codepoint comparison"
>     which
>     is a completely different statement.
>
>     If I'm right, and this is a new comparison rule that goes beyond what
>     JSON itself defines, I think the group should seek extra guidance
>     from
>     Unicode experts. If I'm wrong and this behavior is defined somewhere
>     else, please provide a better pointer to the definition.
>
>     In many environments, its unusual for an implementation relying on a
>     stack below it to have any say at all on whether normalization is
>     going
>     to be applied to the unicode before the application gets to look.
>     Rather
>     than trying to work around the problem you've identified with
>     normalization by specifying the comparison algorithm, consider just
>     making stronger statements about the strings used in the json
>     names the
>     document defines. Why _can't_ you restrict the authorization_details
>     values to ascii? If it's because you want to present the string to a
>     user, consider putting a presentation string elsewhere in the json
>     that
>     is not used for comparison.
>
>
> To the best of my understanding, it's not trying to specify a new or 
> different way of comparing JSON names or values. I think it's only 
> trying to say that the application must not do any *additional* 
> normalization of the string values that it gets from the JSON stack or 
> any other extra processing for the sake of comparison. I think anyway.
>
> Honestly, I didn't really (and still don't) understand the concerns 
> that some of the WG had that led to the text in question. So I didn't 
> pay close attention to it while thinking to myself there can't be harm 
> in saying to do a byte-by-byte comparison with no additional 
> processing. But here we are...
>
> Does that halfhearted explanation alleviate your concerns at all? Or, 
> with that explanation in mind, are there specific changes to the text 
> (in sec 12 
> <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-rar-15.html#section-12> 
> and sec 2 
> <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-oauth-rar-15.html#section-2>, 
> I think) that would alleviate your concerns? Or do we need to consider 
> just deleting those parts?
>
> I did track down this issue about it 
> https://github.com/oauthstuff/draft-oauth-rar/issues/28 for maybe 
> added context.
Thanks for that pointer. If that's the extent, then I really think the 
group should walk this back just a little and answer why restricting 
these names to (a subset of) ascii is an unacceptable thing to do. The 
conversation there reinforces my guess that these aren't meant for 
display to users, so why take on the additional complexity? Make it easy 
for implementors to get it right with much less effort.
>
>
>     Major Issue 2) The suggested pattern demonstrated starting in
>     figure 16
>     (using [] to mean "let the user choose") seems underspecified. If the
>     point is that different APIs may invent different mechanics _like_
>     this,
>     and that this is only an example. Make it much clearer that this
>     is an
>     example. If this is a pattern you expect all APIs to follow, then
>     more
>     description is warranted. Is it intended that a user could add and
>     remove things arbitrarily to such lists? For instance is it intended
>     that this support an interaction where the client is asking for
>     permission to operate on account A, and the user can say "no, but you
>     can operate on account B"?
>
>
> It is really intended to be saying that different APIs may invent 
> different mechanics _like_ this, if needed. And the []'s are just one 
> way that an API might define some of how to do it.
>
> I've tried to make this more clear with these edits: 
> https://github.com/oauthstuff/draft-oauth-rar/commit/ee70e000557a69afe133356847c5083882686811
This works for me. Consider adding something like "This mechanic is 
illustrative only and is not intended to suggest a preference for 
designing the specifics of any authorization details type this way."
>
>
>
> <snip>
>
>
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