RE: Flooding Attacks and MIP6 (was RE: [Mipshop] Review of draft-arkko-mipshop-cga-cba-04)

Hi Christian,
Getting back to this thread again :) Please see inline below. 

> 
> Another thing is that there may actually be no home agent and 
> home domain admin which a victim could contact.  (I mentioned 
> this in the previous email, but I guess it was lost in the 
> noise.)  E.g., an attacker may attach to a public WLAN, 
> acquire a (possibly temporary) IP address, and use this IP 
> address as a HoA in combination with a false CoA.  The 
> attacker itself would then play the HA part during the HoA test.
> 

I thought I had addressed this in one of my emails, but perhaps I
hadn't. If we assume that an attacker can fake an HA (which includes,
among other things, injecting routes for the serving fake home subnet
into the IGP/EGP so that the HoA test can occur correctly), I would also
assume that it is equally feasible for the attacker to intercept the CoA
test messages between the CN and the victim and spoof the CoA test. In
fact, interception and spoofing of messages is potentially simpler than
injecting routes into OSPF or BGP. 

Would you agree? 

Regards,
Vidya

> Of course, the HoA test would in this case guarantee the 
> attacker's reachability of the alleged "HoA", and hence a 
> victim could theoretically track the attacker down by 
> contacting the public WLAN provider.  But there is no clear 
> and, more importantly, fast procedure that the victim could follow.
> 
> Also note that the business relationship between the attacker 
> and the public WLAN provider may only be of temporary nature 
> (e.g., an hourly subscription).
> 

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