Re: [netconf] ietf crypto types - permanently hidden

Juergen Schoenwaelder <j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de> Fri, 22 March 2019 13:07 UTC

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Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2019 14:06:59 +0100
From: Juergen Schoenwaelder <j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>
To: =?utf-8?B?QmFsw6F6cyBLb3bDoWNz?= <balazs.kovacs@ericsson.com>
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Subject: Re: [netconf] ietf crypto types - permanently hidden
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I think we should make sure that it is clear to the client how a
device handles 'hidden' keys, i.e., via a capability (if this is a
system wide property) or via additional knobs that tell the client the
details on a per key basis. It makes a big difference whether a key is
generally protected or only via the NC/RC/.. interface.

/js

On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 12:44:05PM +0000, Balázs Kovács wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> I would really prefer the definition for 'hidden' as 'not accessible via YANG protocols'. The explanation is that regardless of what method I use to create/store the private keys, I still might not want the operator to generate keys outside of the device or configure binary secret strings.
> 
> I considered TPM protection for hidden keys is an option or example so far, which adds limitations or additional complexity for moving keys, but should not be the only option for hidden keys. The descriptions mention TPM as example, then the rest of the text should align also to keep that as example.
> 
> Br,
> Balazs
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Juergen Schoenwaelder <j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>; 
> Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2019 4:29 PM
> To: Balázs Kovács <balazs.kovacs@ericsson.com>;
> Cc: netconf@ietf.org; Kent Watsen <kent@watsen.net>;
> Subject: Re: [netconf] ietf crypto types - permanently hidden
> 
> I agree, I do not understand the second sentence either. My problem is that I do not know what a 'real' private key is, are hidden keys somewhat unreal? Or is "not hidden" = "real"?
> 
> The last sentence can probably be fixed; I think the intention was to say that you can't backup and restore hidden keys by retrieving configuration and restoring the configuration.
> 
> In general, I think we need a definition what a hidden key is. Is something not exposed via a YANG interface a hidden key (but it may be a regular key when using other device access methods)? Or do we require that a hidden key is generally protected? I assume some people want to have flexibility here but from the viewpoint of a security administrator it matters a lot whether 'hidden' means 'generally not accessible' or only 'not accessible via YANG protocols'.
> 
> The description of install-hidden-key seems to indicate a key is already 'hidden' if it only exists in <operational>. Is this really a 'hidden' key or more an 'ephemeral' key?
> 
> /js
> 
> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 02:23:27PM +0000, Balázs Kovács wrote:
> > Hi,
> > 
> > The 'generate-hidden-key' action is meant for cases when the key must be generated in the device and not the operator is configuring it. The 'generate-hidden-key' is said to produce a 'permanently-hidden' asymmetric key. The description of 'permanently-hidden' is as follows:
> > 
> >                 "The private key is inaccessible due to being
> >                   protected by the system (e.g., a cryptographic
> >                   hardware module).  It is not possible to
> >                   configure a permanently hidden key, as a real
> >                   private key value must be set.  Permanently
> >                   hidden keys cannot be archived or backed up.";
> > 
> > Th second sentence doesn't sound right. I can create a permanently hidden key any time by calling the 'generate-hidden-key' action, or if the device or the model allows I could even switch to non-hidden key, I believe, by providing the binary. So I find the second sentence irrelevant in this description.
> > 
> > More importantly, I find the "Permanently hidden keys cannot be archived or backed up" statement false. Isn't that implementation specific how archiving is done? If a device puts the hidden keys on some storage, it may still be possible to back them up. I would prefer to remove this sentence and leave backup considerations to implementations.
> > 
> > Could these changes be done?
> > 
> > Br,
> > Balazs
> 
> > _______________________________________________
> > netconf mailing list
> > netconf@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netconf
> 
> 
> -- 
> Juergen Schoenwaelder           Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH
> Phone: +49 421 200 3587         Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany
> Fax:   +49 421 200 3103         <https://www.jacobs-university.de/>

-- 
Juergen Schoenwaelder           Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH
Phone: +49 421 200 3587         Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany
Fax:   +49 421 200 3103         <https://www.jacobs-university.de/>