Re: [netconf] ietf crypto types - permanently hidden

[Kent Watsen <[e-mail]>]

Okay, I've added the following text into the generate/install-hidden-key descriptions:

OLD:
         The resulting asymmetric key values are
         considered operational state and hence present only in
         <operational>.";

NEW:
         The resulting asymmetric key values are
         considered operational state and hence present only in
         <operational> and bound to the lifetime of the
         parent 'config true' node.  Subsequent invokaions of
         this or the '<other>-hidden-key' action are denied.";

    where <other> is the name of the other action (generate vs. install).


Kent


> On Apr 29, 2019, at 8:24 AM, Balázs Kovács <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Kent, I'm fine with your proposals.
> 
> Regarding subsequent calls to the actions, I agree the safe choice would be to deny them; otherwise, one could run into invalid key pairs (where a certificate was already configured) and authentication failures with network peers (especially in SSH-key-based-authentication case). 
> 
> Br,
> Balazs
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Kent Watsen <[e-mail]>
>> Sent: Wednesday, April 24, 2019 10:30 PM
>> To: Juergen Schoenwaelder <[e-mail]>
>> Cc: Balázs Kovács <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
>> Subject: Re: [netconf] ietf crypto types - permanently hidden
>> 
>> Hi Juergen,
>> 
>> 
>>> Perhaps this should say 'implementation specific' instead 'application
>>> specific'.
>> 
>> Changed in my local copy.
>> 
>> 
>>>> My recommendation is to modify the "generate/install-hidden-key"
>> (renamed to just "generate/install-key") actions to have a flag indicating if
>> the key should be "permanently hidden" (perhaps by using a TPM) or not, in
>> which case configuration is created, same as if the client had used <edit-
>> config>, but without needing to touch the key.
>>> 
>>> I agree that having a flag to control the behavior is useful and I
>>> think there should be explicit text how the action fails in case the
>>> requested action cannot be performed.
>>> 
>>> I am not sure I understand install-hidden-key. The description says:
>>> 
>>>          "Requests the device to load the specified values into
>>>           a hidden key.  The resulting asymmetric key values are
>>>           considered operational state and hence present only in
>>>           <operational>.";
>>> 
>>> So what is the persistence model of this? Does a key installed with
>>> install-hidden-key survive reboots? If so, can I delete somehow such a
>>> hidden key? (Is the answer that this key is tied to the lifetime of
>>> the list element indirectly using this grouping?) Does invoking
>>> install-hidden-key twice cause the first installed key to be
>>> overwritten? Can the install-hidden-key action fail in any way?
>>> 
>>> This leads to related questions for generate-hidden-key: Does invoking
>>> this action twice cause an existing key to be overwritten? Can I
>>> explicitely delete a generated hidden key? Does deleting the list item
>>> that directly or indirectly uses this grouping delete a hidden key?
>> 
>> [Disclaimer: the below reflect my understanding of how the current model
>> works, and does not necessarily reflect if we were to flip things around by
>> letting the actions generate configuration.]
>> 
>> The expectation is that the "permanently hidden" keys would persist,
>> presumably with origin=system.
>> 
>> In the YANG, the "permanently-hidden" enum only appears in the
>> "asymmetric-key-pair-grouping" grouping.   Consuming data models are
>> expected to "use" this grouping under a "config true" node.  This grouping's
>> description statement is noteworthy:
>> 
>> grouping asymmetric-key-pair-grouping {
>>    description
>>      "A private/public key pair.
>> 
>>       The 'algorithm', 'public-key', and 'private-key'  nodes are
>>       not mandatory because they MAY be defined in <operational>.
>>       Implementations SHOULD assert that these values are either
>>       configured or that they exist in <operational>.";
>>    ...
>> }
>> 
>> Thusly it is expected that the client will create the parent node (e.g., via
>> <edit-config>) and then invoke either the generate or install hidden key
>> action.  Presumably, the lifetime of the permanently hidden key would be
>> tied to the lifetime of its parent.
>> 
>> Regarding what happens when the actions are invoked a second time, it's
>> not specified.  One choice, perhaps the safe choice, would be to deny
>> subsequent attempts, forcing the client to create a new parent node instead.
>> If the parent node is in a list, such as in the keystore, then the second key
>> could be created, with certificates bound to it, before mapping reference to
>> the old-key to the new-key.  However, if the key is not in a list, such as when
>> using a "local-definition", then in in-place migration, along with service
>> disruption, would be required.
>> 
>> Of course, one has to ask how often/likely is it that a client wants to
>> regenerate the private key.  Presumably it would only be due to the concern
>> that the key had been compromised (which shouldn't happen if
>> "permanently hidden") or, perhaps, due to a proactive key-rotation policy,
>> thinking (misguided, I believe, proven false now) that the private key's
>> entropy expires over time.  Regardless, the point is that it seems to be an
>> action that would seldomly occur and, when/if it does, the effort to create
>> another parent node (in keystore or a local-definition) might not be a big
>> deal.
>> 
>> PS: words such as "expectation" and "presumably" are used above to
>> indicate a likely need for the text to be more explicit.
>> 
>> Kent // contributor
>> 
>