Re: [netconf] ietf crypto types - permanently hidden

Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> Fri, 03 May 2019 16:23 UTC

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From: Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net>
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Date: Fri, 3 May 2019 16:23:40 +0000
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Subject: Re: [netconf] ietf crypto types - permanently hidden
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I had an idea last night that might inch us closer to a solution.  

Essentially, the generate/install-key operations always populate <operational>, even for keys that are not-hidden, but then a follow-up operation (something like <copy-config>) replicates the not-hidden key in <operational> to <running>.    Two options:

1) A regular-access admin executes the actions to generate the key, get a CSR, configure a resulting signed certificate, etc. and then, as a second step later in time, a special-access admin replicates the key to <running> (perhaps using standard <get-confg> and <edit-config>), so that it can be included in a standard backup and restored to *any* device (since this key is "not-hidden", it isn't encrypted with a device-specific key and hence can be migrated).

2) A regular-access admin executes the actions to generate the key, get a CSR, configure a resulting signed certificate, etc. and then, as a second step (ideally immediately after), the regular-access admin executes a command like <copy-config>, but rather than copying the entire datastore, it just copies a subtree.   

Neither option seems great.  #1 is unappealing being it necessitates coordination between clients.  #2 is unappealing because defining a generic operation for this special case seems too much.   

IMO, allowing <generate-key> to create the configuration directly is the only client-friendly answer.


Kent // contributor