Re: [netmod] Last Call: draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg-03 (20131220)

Martin Bjorklund <mbj@tail-f.com> Sat, 11 January 2014 10:51 UTC

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Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2014 11:51:34 +0100
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To: randy_presuhn@mindspring.com
From: Martin Bjorklund <mbj@tail-f.com>
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Subject: Re: [netmod] Last Call: draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg-03 (20131220)
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"Randy Presuhn" <randy_presuhn@mindspring.com> wrote:
> Hi -
>  
> > From: "Martin Bjorklund" <mbj@tail-f.com>
> > To: <ietfdbh@comcast.net>
> > Cc: <netmod@ietf.org>
> > Sent: Saturday, January 11, 2014 1:13 AM
> > Subject: Re: [netmod] Last Call: draft-ietf-netmod-snmp-cfg-03 (20131220)
> ...
> > > 5) The security implications of not using the RFC3414 method for cloning
> > > and
> > > key change are not discussed.
> > 
> > NETCONF generally over a secure and encrypted transport (this is
> > pointed out in the Security Considerations section) hence the SNMP
> > cloning mechanism is not needed.  I am not sure what kind of text you
> > are looking for.
> ...
> 
> There's more to cloning than transport security.  The way keyChange works
> requires the cloner to know the authKey/privKey of the clone-from user as
> well as the secret key(s) to be used for the new user.
> 
> The Netconf client does not need to know a cloneFrom authKey/privKey to
> create new users, nor does it need to reference an existing user to clone
> from.  Both of these are paths permitting the potential creation of users with
> combinations of protocols not represented in the usmUserTable, or to which
> clone access would have been effectively blocked by an unpublished key change.
> This could, for example, result in a situation where the SNMP security
> administrator
> has blocked the ability for delegated administrators to create a noAuth/noPriv
> user, but left them the ability to create auth/priv users; yet the Netconf
> interface
> would restore that ability to those delegated administrators.
> 
> That's a fairly obvious security implication.  There are probably subtler ones,
> too.
> I don't know whether you consider it a problem, but the properties *are*
> different and should be systematically thought through and documented.

Ok, I agree it makes sense to document this.  It could be viewed as a
feature since we now have a standardized way for the "SNMP security
administrator" to actually set up usm entries for cloning.  These
delegated administrators don't have to have NETCONF access of course.


/martin