Re: [Ntp] Last Call: <draft-ietf-ntp-yang-data-model-10.txt> (A YANG Data Model for NTP) to Proposed Standardsecurity

Dhruv Dhody <dhruv.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 09 February 2021 10:27 UTC

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References: <daedulus@btconnect.com> <60212265.6020204@btconnect.com> <20210209093446.E11F8406061@ip-64-139-1-69.sjc.megapath.net>
In-Reply-To: <20210209093446.E11F8406061@ip-64-139-1-69.sjc.megapath.net>
From: Dhruv Dhody <dhruv.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 09 Feb 2021 15:56:56 +0530
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To: Hal Murray <hmurray@megapathdsl.net>
Cc: tom petch <daedulus@btconnect.com>, last-call@ietf.org, ek.ietf@gmail.com, ntp-chairs@ietf.org, NTP WG <ntp@ietf.org>, Dieter Sibold <dsibold.ietf@gmail.com>, draft-ietf-ntp-yang-data-model@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Ntp] Last Call: <draft-ietf-ntp-yang-data-model-10.txt> (A YANG Data Model for NTP) to Proposed Standardsecurity
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Hi Hal,

Good point, I propose making this change -

OLD:
|     +--rw key?         ianach:crypt-hash
NEW:
|     +--rw key
|     |  +--rw (key-string-style)?
|     |     +--:(keystring)
|     |     |  +--rw keystring?            string
|     |     +--:(hexadecimal) {hex-key-string}?
|     |        +--rw hexadecimal-string?   yang:hex-string
END

The algorithm field already uses the identity
key-chain:crypto-algorithm from RFC 8177 which supports hmac-sha-1-12,
aes-cmac-prf-128, md5, sha-1, hmac-sha-1, hmac-sha-256, hmac-sha-384,
hmac-sha-512 and the ability to add more identities. The above change
would align with RFC 8177.

Thanks,
Dhruv

On Tue, Feb 9, 2021 at 3:05 PM Hal Murray <hmurray@megapathdsl.net> wrote:
>
>
> daedulus@btconnect.com said:
> > RFC8573 seems clear that MD5 must not be used to effect security for NTP  but
> > this I-D imports iana-crypt-hash which allows MD5 without any  restriction,
> > so is MD5 allowed or not?
>
> "Allowed" is the key word.  Just because somebody published an RFC doesn't
> mean that all the gear out in the field will get updated.  As Harlan pointed
> out, there is a very very long tail on NTP deployments.
>
> I think it makes sense for iana-crypt-hash to include slots for historic
> items.  If nothing else, it is a good place to say "historic" or "deprecated"
> and give references to the details.
>
> If you think a Yang model should discourage using MD5, then I suggest adding
> words to say that.  Better would be to phrase things so that it also includes
> other algorithms that get kicked out of the club after the RFC is published.
> I don't know of any place that publishes an up-to-date list of crypto-hashing
> algorithms and their status.
>
> ----------
>
> I'm looking at iana-crypt-hash@2014-08-06.yang
>
> It says:
>          id | hash function | feature
>          ---+---------------+-------------------
>           1 | MD5           | crypt-hash-md5
>           5 | SHA-256       | crypt-hash-sha-256
>           6 | SHA-512       | crypt-hash-sha-512
>
> If NTP is the only use, then I'd suggest adding a deprecated note.  But I
> assume that is used by other than NTP so that may not be appropriate.  But
> maybe if MD5 is deprecated for NTP it should be deprecated for other uses too.
>  ???
>
> What happened to slots 2, 3, and 4?
>
> Existing NTP code also supports SHA-1
>
> RFC 8573 that deprecated using MD5 with NTP suggests using AES-CMAC.  Note
> that is CMAC rather than HMAC and that NTP uses it's own scheme rather than
> HMAC as described in RFC 6151.
>
> The NTPsec code supports any hash (or CMAC) algorithm that the underlying
> library from OpenSSL supports.
>
> --
> These are my opinions.  I hate spam.
>
>
>