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Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft-fett-oauth-dpop-03.txt

Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> Fri, 22 November 2019 07:13 UTC

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References: <2EF412B8-AF8C-4642-9BE0-1B528B0C63D5@amazon.com> <288343F2-ACF0-43E0-8577-26AF45330E5C@forgerock.com>
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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2019 15:13:01 +0800
Message-ID: <CAD9ie-u_SM+1hRuBWR7zBGSi4Ex59Ht0SzoVTeFuWTRc3cFJXw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
Cc: "Richard Backman, Annabelle" <richanna@amazon.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] New Version Notification for draft-fett-oauth-dpop-03.txt
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On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 3:08 PM Neil Madden <neil.madden@forgerock.com>
wrote:

> On 22 Nov 2019, at 01:42, Richard Backman, Annabelle <richanna@amazon.com>
> wrote:
>
> There are key distribution challenges with that if you are doing
> validation at the RS, but validation at the RS using either approach means
> you’ve lost protection against replay by the RS. This brings us back to a
> core question: what threats are in scope for DPoP, and in what contexts?
>
>
> Agreed, but validation at the RS is premature optimisation in many cases.
> And if you do need protection against that the client can even append a
> confirmation key as a caveat and retrospectively upgrade a bearer token to
> a pop token. They can even do transfer of ownership by creating copies of
> the original token bound to other certificates/public keys.
>

While validation at the RS may be an optimization in many cases, it is
still a requirement for deployments.

I echo Annabelle's last question: what threats are in scope (and out of
scope) for DPoP?

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