Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit
John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com> Tue, 27 November 2018 20:37 UTC
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From: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
Cc: "openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net Ab" <openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net>, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>, oauth <oauth@ietf.org>, Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com>
References: <VI1PR0801MB211266BA6F6E06FFB3081425FAD80@VI1PR0801MB2112.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com> <5494f764-2d14-089a-8fe8-132a65e32d5e@manicode.com> <8935ff0f-aeab-c773-5e2d-6fedcc29119d@connect2id.com> <CABzCy2D0JAr-C1-jTcodpBdoUNx1We3JDg-PMcsOBL1Ga_m-Hw@mail.gmail.com> <2297d085-28f2-15dd-6dba-937dce9f2122@manicode.com> <CABzCy2AW0dvmEqfHgd=-ULdYSxnUXwrz6jiCBpKw7MQSu-YFbA@mail.gmail.com> <327B68FD-9449-4809-A3B8-BC79C5B1D42C@lodderstedt.net> <CAANoGhK9cYS8NFrpwczVsifz7pdraqOZpBoDHFZkg_qKdj4Vqg@mail.gmail.com> <E7BA53F0-B925-4C47-9C41-CFBC0EB36D18@lodderstedt.net>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit
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I understand that, but hat is Nat's concern as I understand it. When we say no implicit people, have a problem because implicit is imprecise. We are saying no AT returned in the response from the authorization endpoint. Nat points out that id_token may contain AT for the self issued client. So unless we say that is OK if the AT are sender constrained we wind up implying that a OpenID profile of OAuth is in violation of the BCP. I am just trying to make sure everyone is on the same page with why Nat was -1. It really has nothing to do with the SPA use case. John B. On 11/27/2018 5:28 PM, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote: > Hi John, > > as you said, self issued IDPs (https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#SelfIssued) are supposed to provide the response type „id_token“ only. I don’t think the proposal being discussed here is related to this OIDC mode. > > best regards, > Torsten. > >> Am 27.11.2018 um 20:54 schrieb John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>: >> >> I talked to Nat about this a bit today. >> >> The thing he is concerned about is mostly around the self issued IDP that doesn't have a token endpoint(atleast not easaly). >> >> The main use case for that is the id_token response type where claims are retuned in the id_token. >> >> Because it is fragment encoded some people call that implicit. That is not what we are trying to stop. >> >> In some cases in that flow there may be distributed claims returned with access Token inside the id_token. I think most people would agree that those should be pop or sender constrained tokens. >> >> In the case of self issued the RP would be a server and could do sender constrained via some mechinisim that is yet to be defined. >> >> So if someone wanted to return a access token in a id_token to do distributed claims I don't think we have a problem with that as long as the token is protected by being sender constrained in some reasonable way. >> >> This is a touch hypothetical from the basic OAuth perspective, so I don't know how deep we want to go into it. >> >> I think the point is not to accidently prohibit something that could be done in future. >> >> I also think we should not conflate confidential clients that can authenticate to the token endpoint with sender constrained/PoP clients that can deal with bound tokens. Yes both have keys but it is better to describe them separately. >> >> John B. >> >> On Tue, Nov 27, 2018, 4:30 PM Torsten Lodderstedt via Openid-specs-ab <openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net wrote: >> Hi Nat, >> >> I understand you are saying your draft could provide clients with an application level mechanism to sender constrain access tokens. That’s great! >> >> But I don’t see a binding to response type „token id_token“. Why do you want to expose the tokens via the URL to attackers? >> >> You could easily use your mechanism with code. That would also give you the chance to really authenticate the confidential client before you issue the token. >> >> kind regards, >> Torsten. >> >>> Am 27.11.2018 um 16:57 schrieb Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com>: >>> >>> I am not talking about SPA. >>> The client is a regular confidential client that is running on a server. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Nat Sakimura >>> >>> >>> 2018年11月27日(火) 16:55 Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com>: >>> Nat, >>> >>> How is proof of possession established in a modern web browser in the implicit flow? >>> >>> My understanding is that token binding was removed from Chrome recently effectively killing browser-based PoP tokens. >>> >>> https://identiverse.com/2018/10/31/chrome-puts-token-binding-in-a-bind/ >>> >>> Am I missing something? >>> >>> Aloha, Jim >>> >>> >>> >>> On 11/27/18 9:00 PM, Nat Sakimura wrote: >>>> I am actually -1. >>>> >>>> +1 for public client and the tokens that are not sender/key constrained. >>>> >>>> Just not being used right now does not mean that it is not useful.. In fact, I see it coming. >>>> Implicit (well, Hybrid “token id_token” really) is very useful in certain cases. >>>> Specifically, when the client is confidential (based on public key pair), and uses sender constrained (key-constrained) token such as the one explained in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-jpop-04#section-5, it is very useful. >>>> (Key-constrained token is the remaining portion of this draft that did not get incorporated in the MTLS draft. ) >>>> In fact it is the only viable method for Self-Issued OpenID Provider. >>>> >>>> So, the text is generally good but it needs to be constrained like “Unless the client is confidential and the access token issued is key constrained, ... “ >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Nat Sakimura >>>> >>>> >>>> 2018年11月27日(火) 16:01 Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladimir@connect2id.com>: >>>> +1 to recommend the deprecation of implicit. >>>> >>>> I don't see a compelling reason to keep implicit when there is an >>>> established alternative that is more secure. >>>> >>>> Our duty as WG is to give developers the best and most sensible practice. >>>> >>>> CORS adoption is currently at 94% according to >>>> https://caniuse.com/#feat=cors >>>> >>>> Vladimir >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> -- >>>> Nat Sakimura (=nat) >>>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation >>>> http://nat..sakimura.org/ >>>> @_nat_en >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>> -- >>> Jim Manico >>> Manicode Security >>> >>> https://www.manicode.com >>> -- >>> Nat Sakimura (=nat) >>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation >>> http://nat.sakimura.org/ >>> @_nat_en >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> _______________________________________________ >> Openid-specs-ab mailing list >> Openid-specs-ab@lists.openid.net >> http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs-ab
- [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend aut… Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Mike Jones
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Aaron Parecki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Mike Jones
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Daniel Fett
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Daniel Fett
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Daniel Fett
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Daniel Fett
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Hans Zandbelt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Rifaat Shekh-Yusef
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Antonio Sanso
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Antonio Sanso
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… George Fletcher
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… n-sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Jim Manico
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Vladimir Dzhuvinov
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Jim Manico
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security T… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security T… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security T… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security T… William Denniss
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security T… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security T… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security T… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security T… n-sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] [Openid-specs-ab] OAuth Security T… n-sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… n-sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Richard Backman, Annabelle
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… n-sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… William Denniss
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Petteri Stenius
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… n-sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… William Denniss
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Dave Tonge
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Neil Madden
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Jim Willeke
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Aaron Parecki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… n-sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Daniel Fett
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Vittorio Bertocci
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Dominick Baier
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Dick Hardt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Marius Scurtescu
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Tomek Stojecki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Tomek Stojecki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Tomek Stojecki
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… David Waite
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Vittorio Bertocci
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Vittorio Bertocci
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Vittorio Bertocci
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Vittorio Bertocci
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… David Waite
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Vittorio Bertocci
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Phil Hunt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… David Waite
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Jim Manico
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… David Waite
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Nov Matake
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Nov Matake
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Jim Manico
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Torsten Lodderstedt
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Brock Allen
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Vittorio Bertocci
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… David Waite
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Vittorio Bertocci
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend… Phil Hunt