Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit

Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com> Wed, 28 November 2018 19:58 UTC

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From: Dick Hardt <dick.hardt@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2018 11:57:50 -0800
Message-ID: <CAD9ie-v3onmKc498cg_-a0AD58ZV=aZANtz=UV+Q0f=9N3nSzQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
Cc: oauth@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth Security Topics -- Recommend authorization code instead of implicit
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+1

While there are various mechanisms to alleviate some of the issues of
implicit, I don't think we can recommend specifics, and there may be future
ones in the future. I think we all agree that implicit without any
mitigation is problematic.

How about we recommend against using implicit alone?


On Mon, Nov 19, 2018 at 2:34 AM Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
wrote:

> Hi all,
>
> The authors of the OAuth Security Topics draft came to the conclusion that
> it is not possible to adequately secure the implicit flow against token
> injection since potential solutions like token binding or JARM are in an
> early stage of adoption. For this reason, and since CORS allows
> browser-based apps to send requests to the token endpoint, Torsten
> suggested to use the authorization code instead of the implicit grant in
> call cases in his presentation (see
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/103/materials/slides-103-oauth-sessb-draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-01
> ).
>
> A hum in the room at IETF#103 concluded strong support for his
> recommendations. We would like to confirm the discussion on the list.
>
> Please provide a response by December 3rd.
>
> Ciao
>
> Hannes & Rifaat
>
>
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