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Re: [OAUTH-WG] Issue: 'username' parameter proposal

Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com> Tue, 20 April 2010 18:03 UTC

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From: Brian Eaton <beaton@google.com>
To: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
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Cc: "jsmarr@stanfordalumni.org" <jsmarr@stanfordalumni.org>, OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Issue: 'username' parameter proposal
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On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 10:23 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> wrote:
> I’m not aware of anyone arguing against this feature. The only issue is a
> full security review before we add it to the spec. If one of the security
> experts here can spend a few minutes to review this, we can move forward and
> add it to the draft.

I'd like to see some solutions mature in the wild.  Once we figure out
best practices in the real world, it'll be a lot easier to put good
policy on paper.

I just don't think we have a solid answer, and I don't want something
ending up in the spec that we will regret later.

Cheers,
Brian

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