Re: [OAUTH-WG] Issue: 'username' parameter proposal

Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net> Mon, 19 April 2010 20:34 UTC

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Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2010 22:34:20 +0200
From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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To: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Issue: 'username' parameter proposal
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Do you mean the thread "Signatures, Why?" 
(http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/oauth/trac/wiki/SignaturesWhy)?

I cannot remember that there was a consensus not to use signatures on 
requests to the authorization server.

regards,
Torsten.

Am 19.04.2010 22:14, schrieb Eran Hammer-Lahav:
>
> Which is something we decided not to do when we discussed the use of 
> signatures.
>
> EHL
>
> *From:* Torsten Lodderstedt [mailto:torsten@lodderstedt.net]
> *Sent:* Monday, April 19, 2010 12:19 PM
> *To:* Eran Hammer-Lahav
> *Cc:* Evan Gilbert; OAuth WG
> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Issue: 'username' parameter proposal
>
> in oder to prevent such attacks, one could sign the inbound request
>
> regards,
> Torsten.
>
> Am 19.04.2010 19:58, schrieb Eran Hammer-Lahav:
>
> Thanks. That makes sense.
>
> My concern is that the client will ask for a specific username but an 
> attacker will change that request before it hits the server. The 
> server then asks the (wrong) user to authenticate and returns a token. 
> The client has no way of knowing it got an access token for the wrong 
> user. Does requiring that the server returns the token with the 
> username solves this? Is this a real issue?
>
> I have no objections to this proposal but wanted to see some 
> discussion and support from others before adding it to the spec.
>
> EHL
>
> *From:* Evan Gilbert [mailto:uidude@google.com]
> *Sent:* Monday, April 19, 2010 10:06 AM
> *To:* Eran Hammer-Lahav
> *Cc:* OAuth WG
> *Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] Issue: 'username' parameter proposal
>
> User 1 is logged into Client site
>
> User 2 is logged into IDP site
>
> This can happen quite frequently, as client sites often have 
> long-lived cookies and may only be visited by one user on a shared 
> computer.
>
> Right now client site has no way to ask for a token for User 1, and 
> end result will be that User 1 starts seeing User 2's data.
>
> On Mon, Apr 19, 2010 at 8:37 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav 
> <eran@hueniverse.com <mailto:eran@hueniverse.com>> wrote:
>
> How can they both be logged in? I have never seen a case where two 
> users can be both logged into to the same service at the same time...
>
> EHL
>
>
>
>
> On 4/19/10 8:33 AM, "Evan Gilbert" <uidude@google.com 
> <http://uidude@google.com>> wrote:
>
>     More details on this enhancement.
>
>     Goal: Make sure you get an access token for the right user in
>     immediate mode.
>
>     Use case where we have problems if we don't have username parameter:
>
>        1. Bob is logged into a web site as bob@IDP.com
>           <http://bob@IDP.com>.
>        2. Mary (his wife) is logged into IDP on the same computer as
>           mary@IDP.com <http://mary@IDP.com>
>        3. A request is made to get an access token via the User-Agent
>           flow in immediate mode (or with any redirect without
>           prompting the user)
>        4. -ob now has an access token for Mary and (posts activities,
>           schedules events, gets contacts) as Mary
>        5. Hilarity ensues
>
>
>     Secondary goal: Provide a hint for non-immediate mode
>
>     On Thu, Apr 15, 2010 at 11:55 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav
>     <eran@hueniverse.com <http://eran@hueniverse.com>> wrote:
>
>     Evan Gilbert proposed a 'username' request parameter to allow the
>     client to
>     limit the end user to authenticate using the provided
>     authorization server
>     identifier. The proposal has not been discussed or supported by
>     others, and
>     has not received a security review.
>
>     Proposal: Obtain further discussion and support from others, as
>     well as a
>     security review of the proposal. Otherwise, do nothing.
>
>     EHL
>
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