Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-03
Anil Saldhana <Anil.Saldhana@redhat.com> Tue, 20 May 2014 13:57 UTC
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Date: Tue, 20 May 2014 08:56:59 -0500
From: Anil Saldhana <Anil.Saldhana@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-03
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Brian - I agree with you. It should be MUST as long as the hard limit is generous for usage. On 05/20/2014 07:09 AM, Brian Campbell wrote: > I'd say it should be a MUST so that implementations are consistent > about it. > > > On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 3:27 PM, Bill Mills <wmills_92105@yahoo.com > <mailto:wmills_92105@yahoo.com>> wrote: > > The HTTP specs don't limit these things, but implementations do, > and the problems when you run into them are a rea pain. > > DO we want to make this a hard limit, or should it be guidance in > the form of RECOMMENDED or SHOULD? > > On Friday, May 16, 2014 9:35 AM, Brian Campbell > <bcampbell@pingidentity.com <mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com>> > wrote: > Yeah, I agree with John here. There are a few good reasons to > restrict the length of the code_challenge. One is trying to keep > the authorization request URI to reasonable size as it will > eventually run into various limits on clients and/or servers. The > other is constraining the amount of data that an AS needs to store > per code. > > > > > On Fri, May 16, 2014 at 7:41 AM, John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com > <mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>> wrote: > > From the AS side you probably want to know what the max size > you need to store per code. > > On the call to the token endpoint it is a POST so size should > not be an issue. > > > On May 16, 2014, at 3:10 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakimura@gmail.com > <mailto:sakimura@gmail.com>> wrote: > >> Now that I cannot remember what limit we were hitting, it >> might be a good idea to remove the constraint and see if >> anyone protests. >> >> What do you think? >> >> Nat >> >> >> 2014-05-14 20:46 GMT+09:00 Brian Campbell >> <bcampbell@pingidentity.com <mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com>>: >> >> That too would suggest that the length limit be on >> code_challenge because that's the parameter that will be >> on URIs getting passed around. The code_verifier is sent >> directly in the POST body from client to AS. >> >> >> On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 12:52 AM, Nat Sakimura >> <sakimura@gmail.com <mailto:sakimura@gmail.com>> wrote: >> >> +1 for octet. We used to have "bytes" in JW* so I >> used "bytes" here, while at the same time complaining >> in Jose that it should be "octet". JW* changed to >> "octet" but I failed to sync with it in the last few >> edits. >> >> I do not quite remember which platform, but the >> reason for the limit was that some platform had some >> limitations as to the length of the sting to be >> passed to it through URI and we did not want the >> challenges to be truncated by that limit. >> >> Best, >> >> Nat >> >> >> 2014-05-13 6:56 GMT+09:00 Brian Campbell >> <bcampbell@pingidentity.com >> <mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com>>: >> >> And it'd give the AS some direct guidance on >> protecting itself from crazy long code_challenge >> values rather than relying on the client not to >> do something creative. >> >> >> On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 3:54 PM, Brian Campbell >> <bcampbell@pingidentity.com >> <mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com>> wrote: >> >> Right but that's why I'm asking why not just >> put the limit on code_challange rather than >> inferring it from code_verifyer + challenge >> algorithm, which probably bounds it but >> doesn't necessarily do so? It's not a big >> deal but would read more clearly, I think. >> >> >> On Mon, May 12, 2014 at 3:48 PM, John Bradley >> <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com >> <mailto:ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>> wrote: >> >> I think octets is more consistent with >> other JW* and OAuth specs. >> >> The code_challange is the same length as >> the code_verifyer or is a hash of the >> code_verifyer so likely smaller than >> 128octets (43 ish for base64 256 bit) >> >> Limiting the code_verifyer size sets the >> upper bound for code_challange, unless >> someone comes up with a really creative >> code challenge algorithm. >> >> I will talk to nat about changing it to >> octets when I see him tomorrow. >> >> John B. >> >> On May 12, 2014, at 11:15 PM, Derek >> Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU >> <mailto:warlord@MIT.EDU>> wrote: >> >> > Brian Campbell >> <bcampbell@pingidentity.com >> <mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com>> writes: >> > >> >> I notice that code_verifier is defined >> as "high entropy cryptographic random >> >> string of length less than 128 bytes" >> [1], which brought a few questions and >> >> comments to mind. So here goes: >> >> >> >> Talking about the length of a string >> in terms of bytes is always potentially >> >> confusing. Maybe characters would be >> an easier unit for people like me to wrap >> >> their little brains around? >> > >> > It depends if it really is characters >> or bytes. For example there are >> > many multi-byte UTF-8 characters, so if >> it really is bytes then saying >> > characters is wrong because it could >> overflow. So let's make sure we >> > know what we're talking about. >> Historically, if we're talking bytes the >> > IETF often uses the phrase "octets". >> Would that be less confusing? >> > >> >> Why are we putting a length >> restriction on the code_verifier anyway? >> It seems >> >> like it'd be more appropriate to >> restrict the length of the code_challenge >> >> because that's the thing the AS will >> have to maintain somehow (store in a DB >> >> or memory or encrypt into the code). >> Am I missing something here? >> >> >> >> Let me also say that I hadn't looked >> at this document since its early days in >> >> draft -00 or -01 last summer but I >> like the changes and how it's been kept >> >> pretty simple for the common use-case >> while still allowing for crypto agility/ >> >> extension. Nice work! >> >> >> >> [1] >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse-03#section-3.3 >> > >> > -derek >> > >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> OAuth mailing list >> >> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> >> >> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> > >> > -- >> > Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT >> Media Laboratory >> > Member, MIT Student Information >> Processing Board (SIPB) >> > URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/ >> PP-ASEL-IA N1NWH >> > warlord@MIT.EDU >> <mailto:warlord@MIT.EDU> >> PGP key available >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Ping Identity logo >> <https://www.pingidentity.com/> >> Brian Campbell >> Portfolio Architect >> @ bcampbell@pingidentity.com >> <mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com> >> phone +1 720.317.2061 >> Connect with us... >> twitter logo >> <https://twitter.com/pingidentity> youtube >> logo >> <https://www.youtube.com/user/PingIdentityTV> >> LinkedIn logo >> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/21870> >> Facebook logo >> <https://www.facebook.com/pingidentitypage> >> Google+ logo >> <https://plus.google.com/u/0/114266977739397708540> >> slideshare logo >> <http://www.slideshare.net/PingIdentity> >> flipboard logo <http://flip.it/vjBF7> rss >> feed icon <https://www.pingidentity.com/blogs/> >> >> Register for Cloud Identity Summit 2014 | >> Modern Identity Revolution | 19--23 July, >> 2014 | Monterey, CA >> <https://www.cloudidentitysummit.com/> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Ping Identity logo <https://www.pingidentity.com/> >> Brian Campbell >> Portfolio Architect >> @ bcampbell@pingidentity.com >> <mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com> >> phone +1 720.317.2061 >> Connect with us... >> twitter logo <https://twitter.com/pingidentity> >> youtube logo >> <https://www.youtube.com/user/PingIdentityTV> >> LinkedIn logo >> <https://www.linkedin.com/company/21870> Facebook >> logo <https://www.facebook.com/pingidentitypage> >> Google+ logo >> <https://plus.google.com/u/0/114266977739397708540> >> slideshare logo >> <http://www.slideshare.net/PingIdentity> >> flipboard logo <http://flip.it/vjBF7> rss feed >> icon <https://www.pingidentity.com/blogs/> >> >> Register for Cloud Identity Summit 2014 | Modern >> Identity Revolution | 19--23 July, 2014 | >> Monterey, CA <https://www.cloudidentitysummit.com/> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Nat Sakimura (=nat) >> Chairman, OpenID Foundation >> http://nat.sakimura.org/ >> @_nat_en >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Ping Identity logo <https://www.pingidentity.com/> >> Brian Campbell >> Portfolio Architect >> @ bcampbell@pingidentity.com >> <mailto:bcampbell@pingidentity.com> >> phone +1 720.317.2061 >> Connect with us... >> twitter logo <https://twitter.com/pingidentity> youtube >> logo <https://www.youtube.com/user/PingIdentityTV> >> LinkedIn logo <https://www.linkedin.com/company/21870> >> Facebook logo <https://www.facebook.com/pingidentitypage> >> Google+ logo >> <https://plus.google.com/u/0/114266977739397708540> >> slideshare logo <http://www.slideshare.net/PingIdentity> >> flipboard logo <http://flip.it/vjBF7> rss feed icon >> <https://www.pingidentity.com/blogs/> >> >> Register for Cloud Identity Summit 2014 | Modern Identity >> Revolution | 19--23 July, 2014 | Monterey, CA >> <https://www.cloudidentitysummit.com/> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Nat Sakimura (=nat) >> Chairman, OpenID Foundation >> http://nat.sakimura.org/ >> @_nat_en > > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
- [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura-oau… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… Derek Atkins
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… Nat Sakimura
- [OAUTH-WG] Section 3.2 in draft-sakimura-oauth-tc… Sergey Beryozkin
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… Naveen Agarwal
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… Bill Mills
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… Brian Campbell
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… Anil Saldhana
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… John Bradley
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… Nat Sakimura
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] Question lengths in draft-sakimura… John Bradley