IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [openpgp] Version 5 key and fingerprint proposal

KellerFuchs <KellerFuchs@hashbang.sh> Thu, 09 March 2017 18:47 UTC

Return-Path: <kellerfuchs@hashbang.sh>
X-Original-To: openpgp@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: openpgp@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 10E4412966F for <openpgp@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 9 Mar 2017 10:47:48 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.902
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.902 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0Y81Q9WKfp0Z for <openpgp@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 9 Mar 2017 10:47:47 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.hashbang.sh (mail.hashbang.sh [104.236.46.93]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 359381294F0 for <openpgp@ietf.org>; Thu, 9 Mar 2017 10:47:47 -0800 (PST)
Received: from localhost (to1.hashbang.sh [104.245.37.138]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.hashbang.sh (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 518DA16C83 for <openpgp@ietf.org>; Thu, 9 Mar 2017 18:47:46 +0000 (UTC)
Date: Thu, 09 Mar 2017 18:47:45 +0000
From: KellerFuchs <KellerFuchs@hashbang.sh>
To: openpgp@ietf.org
Message-ID: <20170309184745.GC2@hashbang.sh>
References: <87varlou5m.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <20170307230605.GA2@hashbang.sh> <87efy8ntcx.fsf@wheatstone.g10code.de> <20170309174531.GB2@hashbang.sh>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Disposition: inline
In-Reply-To: <20170309174531.GB2@hashbang.sh>
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12)
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/openpgp/Qm71B4dAgjBXGu-nAD7AU9AnqCg>
Subject: Re: [openpgp] Version 5 key and fingerprint proposal
X-BeenThere: openpgp@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
List-Id: "Ongoing discussion of OpenPGP issues." <openpgp.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/openpgp>, <mailto:openpgp-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/openpgp/>
List-Post: <mailto:openpgp@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:openpgp-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/openpgp>, <mailto:openpgp-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 09 Mar 2017 18:47:48 -0000

On Thu, Mar 09, 2017 at 05:45:31PM +0000, KellerFuchs wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 08, 2017 at 08:02:54AM +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
> > That was a suggestion from the Berlin meeting.
> > 
> > Given that even for SHA-1 no pre-image attack is known, we get quite
> > some security margin by using 200 bits from SHA-256 over the 160 from
> > SHA-1.
> > [...]
> 
> Thanks a bunch for the explanation, this makes sense.

PS: I still don't get what's the advantage of SHA-256 there over Blake2,
    given the current library support situation, security analysis and
    performance.

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email