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Re: [openpgp] Version 5 key and fingerprint proposal

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 09 March 2017 19:11 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Thu, 09 Mar 2017 11:11:03 -0800
Message-ID: <CABcZeBMhpXy-e9Mtp8LwfqfAVW_ks3JBw1H2N3H_0c4gpQBqpg@mail.gmail.com>
To: KellerFuchs <KellerFuchs@hashbang.sh>
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Cc: openpgp@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [openpgp] Version 5 key and fingerprint proposal
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On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 10:47 AM, KellerFuchs <KellerFuchs@hashbang.sh>
wrote:

> On Thu, Mar 09, 2017 at 05:45:31PM +0000, KellerFuchs wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 08, 2017 at 08:02:54AM +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
> > > That was a suggestion from the Berlin meeting.
> > >
> > > Given that even for SHA-1 no pre-image attack is known, we get quite
> > > some security margin by using 200 bits from SHA-256 over the 160 from
> > > SHA-1.
> > > [...]
> >
> > Thanks a bunch for the explanation, this makes sense.
>
> PS: I still don't get what's the advantage of SHA-256 there over Blake2,
>     given the current library support situation, security analysis and
>     performance.
>

I don't know anything about PGP library support, but my experience, at
least with SSL/TLS stacks, is that there is a lot more SHA-256 support than
support for {SHA-3, Blake2}
-Ekr


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