Re: [openpgp] Version 5 key and fingerprint proposal

KellerFuchs <KellerFuchs@hashbang.sh> Thu, 09 March 2017 17:45 UTC

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Date: Thu, 09 Mar 2017 17:45:31 +0000
From: KellerFuchs <KellerFuchs@hashbang.sh>
To: openpgp@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Version 5 key and fingerprint proposal
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On Wed, Mar 08, 2017 at 08:02:54AM +0100, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Wed,  8 Mar 2017 00:06, KellerFuchs@hashbang.sh said:
> 
> > Since it's not entirely clear (at least to me) if this means keeping the 20
> > rightmost octets or dropping octets right of the 25th, not introducing it
> > is not ideal.
> 
> What about this:

This is very nice: basically as concise, and completely unambiguous
so it doesn't need a definition  :)


> [...]
> > Also, but I likely missed the relevant WG thread, why truncate the
> > fingerprint to 200 bits? (Not that this is likely an issue.)
> 
> That was a suggestion from the Berlin meeting.
> 
> Given that even for SHA-1 no pre-image attack is known, we get quite
> some security margin by using 200 bits from SHA-256 over the 160 from
> SHA-1.
> 
> When a truncated SHA-256 shows weaknesses we only need to replace two
> signature subpackets but the fingerrprint won't change.
> 
> Due to the use of the 'Issuer Fingerpint' the signatures grow in size by
> 22 octets which is substantal for ECC signatures.  With the full V5
> fingerprint this would increase to 25 octets (34 - 9 from the not used
> 'Issuer' subpacket).  By truncating the fingerprint we will only use 18
> octets which is even a saving compared to V4 keys.

Thanks a bunch for the explanation, this makes sense.


Best,

  kf