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Re: [openpgp] To bind or not to bind

Bart Butler <bart+ietf@pm.me> Fri, 22 March 2024 12:00 UTC

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Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 11:59:54 +0000
To: Kai Engert <KaiE@kuix.de>
From: Bart Butler <bart+ietf@pm.me>
Cc: Aron Wussler <aron@wussler.it>, "openpgp@ietf.org" <openpgp@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] To bind or not to bind
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I think it would be advantageous and simpler to bind PQC to V6. It would limit the combinatorics and help encourage adoption.

I think it would be a mistake to limit PQC to SEIPDv2 unless there is a compelling technical reason I'm missing. As a "policy" choice it sounds harmful.

So, yes on (1), no on (2).

-Bart

On Friday, March 22nd, 2024 at 12:50 PM, Kai Engert <KaiE@kuix.de> wrote:

> 

> 

> On 21.03.24 21:26, Aron Wussler wrote:
> 

> > - (1) may be justified because some implementations fail parsing keys [1]. Of this plot is particularly relevant the 3rd line (Unknown algo, opaque encoding, small), that would be equivalent to attach an ML-KEM + X25519 subkey to an existing v4 certificate. All V6 implementations are required not to choke on unknown algorithms.
> 

> 

> What kind of failures can be seen with those implementations?
> 

> Will they allow importing it, but then run into a failure later on when
> trying to use it? That would be an argument for not distributing such
> keys at all.
> 

> Or will ALL of them detect the incompatibilityat import time, and refuse
> the import? That would be less problematic. Then probably v4-pqc and v6
> keys would be rejected in the same way.
> 

> Users of both v4-pqc and v6 keys would equally have the problem that
> they need to provide classic v4 keys for their incompatible correspondents.
> 

> However, if v4-pqc is allowed, it might allow some implementations to
> become compatible with pqc more easily.
> 

> Kai
> 

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