Re: [openpgp] To bind or not to bind

Andrew Gallagher <andrewg@andrewg.com> Fri, 22 March 2024 23:38 UTC

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From: Andrew Gallagher <andrewg@andrewg.com>
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Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 23:37:43 +0000
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Cc: Justus Winter <justus@sequoia-pgp.org>, Aron Wussler <aron@wussler.it>, openpgp@ietf.org
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To: Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] To bind or not to bind
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Hi, Kai. 

On 22 Mar 2024, at 21:21, Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de> wrote:
> 
> We don't have data on what today's intolerant implementations would do when their users were commonly faced with users complaining about nonworking keys.
> 
> Given that we don't have that data, all we can do is speculate.

So let’s get some data. Make up some test keys and import them to a few implementations. We don’t have to decide whether to forbid v4 pqc encryption until we have the results. If implementations are fine (or are fixed quickly) then allowing v4 seems like a quick win. If not, then fair enough.

A