Re: [OPSEC] OPSEC control plane protection draft

["Smith, Donald" <[e-mail]>]

(coffee != sleep) & (!coffee == sleep)
[e-mail] gcia

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Rodney Dunn [mailto:[e-mail]]
> Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2010 2:06 PM
> To: Christopher Morrow
> Cc: Smith, Donald; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> Subject: Re: [OPSEC] OPSEC control plane protection draft
>
> We agree that the end goal should be to lock the device down
> to the most
> granular degree possible. We made an effort to highlight that
> at various
> places in the document. I like your suggestion to add an additional
> paragraph specifically highlighting the importance of getting
> to a point
> where the default traffic would be a drop. Could you review the
> paragraph below between *-*'s and make suggestions to wording if it's
> not explicit or clear enough?
>
> Thanks,
> Rodney
>
> Some references already in the document are...
>
> ie: Section 3.2 Filter Design
>
> ..By adjusting the granularity and order of the filters more
>     granular forensics can be performed...
>
> In addition to the filters, rate-limiters for certain classes of
>     traffic are also installed in the forwarding plane as defined in
>     Section 3.1.  These rate limiters help futher control the traffic
>     that will reach the control plane for each filtered class
> as well as
>     all traffic not matching an explicit class.  The actual rates
>     selected for various classes is network deployment specific and
>     analysis of required rates for stability should be done
> periodically.
>
> and the note for the catch all:
>
> Syntactically, these filters explicitly define "allowed" traffic
>     (including IP addresses, protocols, and ports), define acceptable
>     actions for these acceptable traffic profiles (e.g., rate-limit or
>     simply permit the traffic), and then drop to the bit bucket all
>     traffic destined to the router control plane that is not
> within the
>     specifications of the policy definition.
>
>
> and in Section 3.3 we wanted to articulate the importance of
> locking it
> down as granular as possible:
>
> ...The goal of the method for protecting the router control
> plane is to
>     minimize the possibility for disruptions by reducing the
> vulnerable
>     surface.  The latter is inversely proportional to the
> granularity of
>     the filter design.  The finer the granularity of the filter design
>     (e.g., isolating a more targeted subset of traffic from
> the rest of
>     the policed traffic, or isolating valid source addresses into a
>     different class or classes) the smaller the probability of
>     disruption.
> ...
>
> What about if we add this in the Design
> Trade-Off section to address the concern so we will be more precise.
>
> *In addition to the traffic matching explicit classes care should be
> taken on the policy decision that governs the handling of
> traffic that
> would fall through the policy.
Do we need to say that by convention there is no default deny at the end of a cpp policy?



>Typically that traffic is
> referred to as
> traffic falling in the default class. It may also be traffic that
into the default ...
> matches a generic protocol specific class where previous classes that
> have more granular matching did not match all packets for
> that specific
> protocol. The ideal policy would have explicit classes to
> match only the
> traffic specifically required at the control plane and drop all other
> traffic. This approach requires rigorous traffic pattern
> identification
> such that a default drop policy does not break existing
> functionality of
> the device. The approach defined in this document allows the default
> traffic and rate limits it rather than just dropping it. This
> approach
> was highlighted as a way to give time to the implementer to
> evaluate the
> traffic in a production scenario prior to dropping all traffic not
> explicitly matched and permitted. However, it is highly
> recommended that
> after monitoring the traffic matching the default class
> explicit classes
> should be defined such that the default class could be configured to
> drop traffic falling through the policy.*

Can we add a COMMENTED OUT deny ip any any in the default policy with a
"do not enable until throughly tested in production ..." type statement.

>
>
> Rodney
>
>
>
> On 8/16/10 9:58 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 16, 2010 at 9:34 PM, Rodney
> Dunn<[e-mail]>  wrote:
> >> Donald,
> >>
> >> First thanks for the comment. It's a good one. We actually
> originally had it
> >> with a default drop for the all IP and default classes.
> However, after a
> >> good bit of discussion we (both Cisco and Juniper) felt
> that we should
> >> soften it up just a bit. We agreed to add the explicit
> match for the ALLIP
> >> class so it could be monitored and then tightened down further.
> >>
> >> We realized there were various opinions on how that should be done.
> >
> > can we get a 'first verify complete COPP coverage, then deny all
> > remaining traffic with $INSERT_PROPER_DENY_HERE' paragraph?
> >
> > It sounds like someone with a legal degree got to your final
> > recommendation :) that, operationally, leaves the network
> with a whole
> > to plug, and I can guarantee that someone with a scanning virus is
> > gonna fill it for you :(
> >
> > -chris
> >
> >> ie:
> >>
> >> http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/coppwp_gs.html
> >>
> >>
> >> Thanks,
> >> Rodney
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On 8/16/10 5:16 PM, Smith, Donald wrote:
> >>>
> >>> For undesirables in JTK's paper here he specifically did
> a deny ip any any
> >>> at the end of the cpp policy for that.
> >>>
> >>> http://aharp.ittns.northwestern.edu/papers/copp.html
> >>>
> >>> The default term for juniper is log and discard.
> >>>
> >>> There isn't a deny ip any any in the draft.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> (coffee != sleep)&    (!coffee == sleep)
> >>> [e-mail] gcia
> >>>
> >>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>> From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]]
> >>>> On Behalf Of Rob Bird
> >>>> Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 11:28 AM
> >>>> To: David Dugal
> >>>> Cc: [e-mail];
> >>>> [e-mail]
> >>>> Subject: Re: [OPSEC] OPSEC control plane protection draft
> >>>>
> >>>> This is most excellent. I was just advising a customer this
> >>>> morning on this very issue (again).
> >>>>
> >>>> I look forward to working on this.
> >>>> Rob
> >>>>
> >>>> -
> >>>> Rob Bird, Chief Technology Officer
> >>>> Red Lambda, Inc.
> >>>> "Network security at global scale"
> >>>> www.redlambda.com
> >>>>
> >>>>        On Mar 26, 2010 1:03 PM, "David Dugal"
> >>>> <[e-mail]>    wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>        -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> >>>>        Hash: SHA1
> >>>>
> >>>>        Hi Richard.
> >>>>
> >>>>        Thank you very much for the scrutiny, analysis
> and feedback.  As
> >>>>        mentioned during my brief presentation, our hope
> is that this
> >>>>        recommendation by example will provide awareness of a
> >>>> possible attack
> >>>>        surface occasionally overlooked, especially by
> smaller or newer
> >>>>        installations.
> >>>>
> >>>>        I appreciate the feedback and will enhance the draft to
> >>>> make reference
> >>>>        to cryptographic security, as well as attempt to make
> >>>> the document IP
> >>>>        version agnostic.
> >>>>
> >>>>        Thank you for your support, both in carefully reading
> >>>> the document, and
> >>>>        for your willingness to have our draft taken under the
> >>>> OPSEC WG wing.
> >>>>
> >>>>        - ---
> >>>>        David G. Dugal                           Support:
> >>>> [phone]
> >>>>        Security Incident Response Team          Direct:
> >>>> [phone]
> >>>>        Juniper Networks                         Mobile:
> >>>> [phone]
> >>>>        Westford, MA, USA                        PGP Key:
> 0xAB6E02A5
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>        On Fri Mar 26 2010 09:06:40 GMT-0700 (Pacific Daylight
> >>>> Time), Richard
> >>>>        Graveman<[e-mail]>    proclaimed ...
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>        >    David,
> >>>>        >
> >>>>        >    I read the draft carefully after the meeting and
> >>>> realize that my
> >>>>        >    comments missed the...
> >>>>
> >>>>        >    .
> >>>>        >
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> iEYEARECAAYFAkus53cACgkQh59lzatuAqVE9wCgh53mgxNRPWUztlI27aOITHRr
> >>>>        2zMAoPb5y3phm260P1zSoDu0LSbUjNcN
> >>>>        =kitD
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> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>        _______________________________________________
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> >>>>
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