Re: [OPSEC] OPSEC control plane protection draft

Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com> Tue, 17 August 2010 17:42 UTC

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Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2010 13:43:12 -0400
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From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
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Cc: "draft-dugal-opsec-protect-control-plane@tools.ietf.org" <draft-dugal-opsec-protect-control-plane@tools.ietf.org>, "opsec@ietf.org" <opsec@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OPSEC] OPSEC control plane protection draft
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On Tue, Aug 17, 2010 at 11:30 AM, Smith, Donald <Donald.Smith@qwest.com> wrote:
> While difficult to get right leaving a hole to allow "unknown stuff" to go to the control plane is counter-intuitive if we are talking about protecting the control plane.
>
> When I write about mitigations for router vulnerabilities within our network one of the things I often include in the mitigations is the fact that the services and control plane of the routers is locked down. Almost locked down with a hole that may or may not allow something that could trigger the vulnerability is not as good:)
>
> This is one of the reasons we had that whole logging of exceptions/dropped traffic discussion a while back.
> Not just a counter actual logging (sampled ok, syslog or snmp ... ok ... but some logging of traffic similar to a netflow record would be helpful).

+1 to the entire message here... you just don't want to leave open
holes, ever, in critical infrastructure.

-chris

> (coffee != sleep) & (!coffee == sleep)
> Donald.Smith@qwest.com gcia
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: christopher.morrow@gmail.com
>> [mailto:christopher.morrow@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Christopher Morrow
>> Sent: Monday, August 16, 2010 7:59 PM
>> To: rodunn@cisco.com
>> Cc: Smith, Donald;
>> draft-dugal-opsec-protect-control-plane@tools.ietf.org; opsec@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [OPSEC] OPSEC control plane protection draft
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 16, 2010 at 9:34 PM, Rodney Dunn <rodunn@cisco.com> wrote:
>> > Donald,
>> >
>> > First thanks for the comment. It's a good one. We actually
>> originally had it
>> > with a default drop for the all IP and default classes.
>> However, after a
>> > good bit of discussion we (both Cisco and Juniper) felt
>> that we should
>> > soften it up just a bit. We agreed to add the explicit
>> match for the ALLIP
>> > class so it could be monitored and then tightened down further.
>> >
>> > We realized there were various opinions on how that should be done.
>>
>> can we get a 'first verify complete COPP coverage, then deny all
>> remaining traffic with $INSERT_PROPER_DENY_HERE' paragraph?
>>
>> It sounds like someone with a legal degree got to your final
>> recommendation :) that, operationally, leaves the network with a whole
>> to plug, and I can guarantee that someone with a scanning virus is
>> gonna fill it for you :(
>>
>> -chris
>>
>> > ie:
>> >
>> > http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/coppwp_gs.html
>> >
>> >
>> > Thanks,
>> > Rodney
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On 8/16/10 5:16 PM, Smith, Donald wrote:
>> >>
>> >> For undesirables in JTK's paper here he specifically did a
>> deny ip any any
>> >> at the end of the cpp policy for that.
>> >>
>> >> http://aharp.ittns.northwestern.edu/papers/copp.html
>> >>
>> >> The default term for juniper is log and discard.
>> >>
>> >> There isn't a deny ip any any in the draft.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> (coffee != sleep)&  (!coffee == sleep)
>> >> Donald.Smith@qwest.com gcia
>> >>
>> >>> -----Original Message-----
>> >>> From: opsec-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:opsec-bounces@ietf.org]
>> >>> On Behalf Of Rob Bird
>> >>> Sent: Friday, March 26, 2010 11:28 AM
>> >>> To: David Dugal
>> >>> Cc: draft-dugal-opsec-protect-control-plane@tools.ietf.org;
>> >>> opsec@ietf.org
>> >>> Subject: Re: [OPSEC] OPSEC control plane protection draft
>> >>>
>> >>> This is most excellent. I was just advising a customer this
>> >>> morning on this very issue (again).
>> >>>
>> >>> I look forward to working on this.
>> >>> Rob
>> >>>
>> >>> -
>> >>> Rob Bird, Chief Technology Officer
>> >>> Red Lambda, Inc.
>> >>> "Network security at global scale"
>> >>> www.redlambda.com
>> >>>
>> >>>       On Mar 26, 2010 1:03 PM, "David Dugal"
>> >>> <ddugal@juniper.net>  wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>       -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>> >>>       Hash: SHA1
>> >>>
>> >>>       Hi Richard.
>> >>>
>> >>>       Thank you very much for the scrutiny, analysis and
>> feedback.  As
>> >>>       mentioned during my brief presentation, our hope is
>> that this
>> >>>       recommendation by example will provide awareness of a
>> >>> possible attack
>> >>>       surface occasionally overlooked, especially by
>> smaller or newer
>> >>>       installations.
>> >>>
>> >>>       I appreciate the feedback and will enhance the draft to
>> >>> make reference
>> >>>       to cryptographic security, as well as attempt to make
>> >>> the document IP
>> >>>       version agnostic.
>> >>>
>> >>>       Thank you for your support, both in carefully reading
>> >>> the document, and
>> >>>       for your willingness to have our draft taken under the
>> >>> OPSEC WG wing.
>> >>>
>> >>>       - ---
>> >>>       David G. Dugal                           Support:
>> >>> +1-408-745-9500
>> >>>       Security Incident Response Team          Direct:
>> >>> +1-978-589-0719
>> >>>       Juniper Networks                         Mobile:
>> >>> +1-603-377-1162
>> >>>       Westford, MA, USA                        PGP Key: 0xAB6E02A5
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>       On Fri Mar 26 2010 09:06:40 GMT-0700 (Pacific Daylight
>> >>> Time), Richard
>> >>>       Graveman<rfgraveman@gmail.com>  proclaimed ...
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>       >  David,
>> >>>       >
>> >>>       >  I read the draft carefully after the meeting and
>> >>> realize that my
>> >>>       >  comments missed the...
>> >>>
>> >>>       >  .
>> >>>       >
>> >>>       -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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>> >>>
>> >>>
>> iEYEARECAAYFAkus53cACgkQh59lzatuAqVE9wCgh53mgxNRPWUztlI27aOITHRr
>> >>>       2zMAoPb5y3phm260P1zSoDu0LSbUjNcN
>> >>>       =kitD
>> >>>       -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>       _______________________________________________
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>> >>>       https://www.ietf.o...
>> >>>
>> >>>
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