Re: [Pana] What to do with I-D: draft-ietf-pana-ipsec

Right.

Jari

Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote:
> If the use of the key is entirely within the PANA authenticator and PANA
> specifications then using the MSK is OK.  If the same key is going to be
> used in specifications independent of PANA (802.11, etc) or used
> somewhere other than the authenticator then the MSK may not be a good
> choice.  
>
>   
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: pana-bounces@ietf.org [mailto:pana-bounces@ietf.org] On 
>> Behalf Of Jari Arkko
>> Sent: Wednesday, April 15, 2009 7:06 AM
>> To: Alper Yegin
>> Cc: yohba@tari.toshiba.com; pana@ietf.org; Basavaraj.Patil@nokia.com
>> Subject: Re: [Pana] What to do with I-D: draft-ietf-pana-ipsec
>>
>> I think I agree with what Alper is saying below. It is 
>> obviously important to have separated keys for PANA itself 
>> and the per-packet protection (such as for IPsec). But given 
>> the definition of the keys used for PANA in the RFC, I think 
>> it is possible to have other MSK-derived keys for IPsec.
>>
>> Jari
>>
>> Alper Yegin wrote:
>>     
>>>> As
>>>> for draft-ohba-pana-pemk-02, it specifies (as does 5191) 
>>>>         
>> the use of 
>>     
>>>> the MSK which is a _really_ bad idea IMHO -- the EMSK 
>>>>         
>> should really 
>>     
>>>> be used instead.
>>>>     
>>>>         
>>> Why so?
>>>
>>> Secure association protocols have been using MSK-driven keys.
>>> And it makes sense, as MSK is what NAS knows (not EMSK).
>>> I have no idea what value using EMSK has, but the obvious 
>>>       
>> cost is to 
>>     
>>> impact the AAA deployment between the NAS and AAA servers. 
>>>       
>> Today AAA 
>>     
>>> protocols deliver MSK, not EMSK or any of its children.
>>>
>>> Alper
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>   
>>>       
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>>     
>
>
>   