Re: [Patient] DOJ first on encryption services

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Tue, 03 July 2018 16:00 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2018 08:59:32 -0700
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To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: tony@yaanatech.co.uk, "patient@ietf.org" <patient@ietf.org>, Brian Witten <brian_witten@symantec.com>, "Diego R. Lopez" <diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com>
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Subject: Re: [Patient] DOJ first on encryption services
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On Tue, Jul 3, 2018 at 8:09 AM, Kathleen Moriarty <
kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>; wrote:

> On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 9:06 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>; wrote:
> >
> >
> > On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 12:54 PM, Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.co..uk>
> > wrote:
> >>
> >> Your point is one that deserves further discussion, Eric - which seems
> >> likely to scale rapidly going forward.  It is key.
> >>
> >> So how does draft-ietf-tls-sni-encryption it into the argument?
> >
> >
> > As you suggest, SNI encryption is intended to conceal the SNI, which of
> > course would make SNI inspection difficult.
> >
> > My evaluation of the current state of SNI encryption is that given the
> > current technical state, it will not see particularly wide deployment,
> with
> > the primary scenario being "at-risk" sites who are subject to censorship
> who
> > either hide behind or co-tenant with sites which are not subject to
> > censorship. That probably isn't going to be incredibly common right now.
> Of
> > course, this is regrettable from the perspective of people designing
> these
> > protocols, but I think that's the situation.
>
> EKR posted a draft to encrypt SNI, see:
> https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26468.html
>
> It targets the CDNs who host most of the web traffic in the US at
> least.  The right place to comment on this would be the TLS list of
> course, but since proposals are being posted, this is a reality and
> needs to be discussed.  Those using SNI need to make sure their use
> cases are clear and understood and argue the pros and cons.
>

Kathleen,

Thanks for pointing out this draft.

As they say, predictions are hard, especially about the future. In March,
the ESNI problem looked pretty intractable and then subsequently we had
this idea about why it might be workable.

-Ekr

Best regards,
> Kathleen
>
> >
> > -Ekr
> >
> >> On 18-Mar-18 8:45 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> >>
> >> On Sun, Mar 18, 2018 at 12:30 PM, Tony Rutkowski <tony@yaanatech.co.uk>;
> >> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Hi Diego,
> >>>
> >>> It is also worth referencing a relatively recent Lawfare article on the
> >>> scaling litigation in the U.S. against those supporting e2e encryption
> >>> services or capabilities.
> >>>
> >>> https://www.lawfareblog.com/did-congress-immunize-twitter-
> against-lawsuits-supporting-isis
> >>>
> >>> This litigation trend is also likely to increase the insurance costs of
> >>> providers.  Indeed, a provider that supports TLS1.3, QUIC, SNI, etc,
> may not
> >>> even be able to get insurance.  It may be fun and games to play crypto
> rebel
> >>> in venues like the IETF where the risk exposure is minimal, but when it
> >>> comes to real world consequences and costs, the equations for
> providers are
> >>> rather different.
> >>
> >>
> >> I think this rather overestimates the degree to which both TLS 1.3 and
> >> QUIC change the equation about what a provider is able to determine from
> >> traffic inspection. As a practical matter, the primary change from TLS
> 1.2
> >> is that the provider does not get to see the server's certificate, but
> it
> >> does see the SNI. Given that the SNI contains the identity of the server
> >> that the client is connected to and that the other identities in the
> >> certificate are often whatever the provider decided to co-locate on the
> same
> >> machine, I'm not sure how much information you are really losing.
> >>
> >> -Ekr
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> --tony
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> PATIENT mailing list
> >>> PATIENT@ietf.org
> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> PATIENT mailing list
> >> PATIENT@ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient
> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > PATIENT mailing list
> > PATIENT@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/patient
> >
>
>
>
> --
>
> Best regards,
> Kathleen
>