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Re: [perpass] DNS confidentiality

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Wed, 13 November 2013 02:49 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2013 21:48:57 -0500
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To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
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Cc: Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>, perpass <perpass@ietf.org>, Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>, Andy Wilson <andrewgwilson@gmail.com>, "Wiley, Glen" <gwiley@verisign.com>, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [perpass] DNS confidentiality
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On Nov 12, 2013, at 8:32 PM, Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
> The converse argument was just made on the TLS list yesterday to
> the effect that there's no point in TLS 1.3 (or a TLS 1.2 extension)
> encrypting SNI because its the same as the obviously cleartext DNS
> query in many cases.

That's a terrible argument.   Then every eavesdropping issue becomes a chicken-and-egg problem, because nobody is willing to go first.

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