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Re: [perpass] DNS confidentiality

Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com> Wed, 13 November 2013 14:32 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>
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Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2013 09:32:35 -0500
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To: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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Subject: Re: [perpass] DNS confidentiality
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On Nov 13, 2013, at 12:22 AM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com> wrote:
> I'm one of those that made that argument. I do think we should fix this in TLS, but realistically, browsers are going to continue sending SNI in the clear for at least another 10 years. Yes, we should fix this now, because whenever we start, that's when the 10-year countdown begins. The same is true for any modification to DNS, except the timeframe is likely to be even longer.

That doesn't sound *quite* like what I heard Stephen say, and I don't disagree with it, although I don't agree either—it's hard to predict what browser people will do, and ten years is a long time in the browser business.   So you might as well fix the spec, and see what happens.

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