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Re: [perpass] comments and questions for the group on draft-farrell-perpass-attack-02

Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com> Mon, 09 December 2013 22:08 UTC

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Message-ID: <52A63F64.3090908@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2013 11:08:36 +1300
From: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
Organization: University of Auckland
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To: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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Cc: perpass <perpass@ietf.org>, Internet Architecture Board <iab@iab.org>, 'IESG' <iesg@ietf.org>, Eric Burger <eburger@standardstrack.com>
Subject: Re: [perpass] comments and questions for the group on draft-farrell-perpass-attack-02
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On 10/12/2013 02:59, Eliot Lear wrote:
> On 12/9/13 1:43 PM, Eric Burger wrote:
>> So if the "operational realities" of the operator include a mandate to
>> intercept, like with a law like CALEA in the United States, then
>> pervasive monitoring is OK?
>>
> 
> This does not negate the existing RFCs that speak to that.

My understanding of the debate in Vancouver was that we intend
to go one step beyond the RAVEN consensus (RFC 2804). Then, we
agreed not to consider wiretapping requirements as part of the
standards development process. This time, we agreed to treat
pervasive surveillance as an attack, and therefore to try to
make protocols resistant to it.

Which is completely disjoint from whether operators deploy
anti-surveillance measures; that is a matter of national law
and not our department.

   Brian

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