Re: [perpass] comments and questions for the group on draft-farrell-perpass-attack-02
Eric Burger <eburger@standardstrack.com> Mon, 09 December 2013 12:44 UTC
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From: Eric Burger <eburger@standardstrack.com>
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Cc: Internet Architecture Board <iab@iab.org>, 'IESG' <iesg@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [perpass] comments and questions for the group on draft-farrell-perpass-attack-02
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So if the "operational realities" of the operator include a mandate to intercept, like with a law like CALEA in the United States, then pervasive monitoring is OK? Sent from my mobile device. Thanks be to LEMONADE: http://www.standardstrack.com/ietf/lemonade S2ERC: http://s2erc.georgetown.edu/ GCSC: http://gcsc.georgetown.edu/ Me: http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~ eburger -------- Original message -------- From: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> Date:12/09/2013 7:29 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "ietf-interest(mailer list)" <ietf-interest@cisco.com>,perpass <perpass@ietf.org> Cc: Internet Architecture Board <iab@iab.org>,'IESG' <iesg@ietf.org> Subject: [perpass] comments and questions for the group on draft-farrell-perpass-attack-02 These comments follow a thread from the IAB/IESG mailing list. There has been some confusion over how this proposed BCP should be taken by working groups. At least one working group chair has inferred, if not suggested, that a document before the IESG that does not demonstrate it has mitigated pervasive surveillance will get returned. That wouldn't be appropriate, in my opinion. A working group must consider the operational realities that it is attempting to code to. There are many tensions to consider, not just a narrow view of network management (a phrase that might itself be left to ambiguous interpretation). I have in mind as an example a service provider that does transparent/intercepting HTTP caching for purposes of bandwidth preservation in bandwidth-constrained environments. Another example would be an environment in which security and governance are key. As such, I propose the following two changes to clarify the text in Section 2: 2nd para: OLD: > This BCP simply records the consensus to design > protocols so as to mitigate the attack, where possible. NEW: > This BCP simply records the consensus to design > protocols so as to mitigate the attack, taking into account > operational realities of network operators. Next para: OLD: > More limited-scope monitoring to assist with network management that > is required in order to operate the network or an application is not > considered pervasive monitoring. There is though a clear potential > for such limited monitoring mechanisms to be abused as part of > pervasive monitoring, so this tension needs careful consideration in > protocol design. Making networks unmanageable in order to mitigate > pervasive monitoring would not be an acceptable outcome. But > equally, ignoring pervasive monitoring in designing network > management mechanisms would go against the consensus documented in > this BCP. An appropriate balance will likely emerge over time as > real instances of this tension are considered. NEW: > More limited-scope monitoring or other services or to assist with > network operations that > is required in order to operate the network or an application is not > considered pervasive monitoring, > There is though a clear potential > for such mechanisms to be abused as part of > pervasive monitoring, so this tension needs careful consideration in > protocol design. Making networks unmanageable in order to mitigate > pervasive monitoring would not be an acceptable outcome. But > equally, ignoring pervasive monitoring in designing network > management mechanisms would go against the consensus documented in > this BCP. An appropriate balance will likely emerge over time as > real instances of this tension are considered. And so someone operating a small ISP with a cache in Madagascar or the SP trying to manage bandwidth on a train can also have their considerations taken into account. It's for a working group to decide how far to accommodate them, of course. Eliot _______________________________________________ perpass mailing list perpass@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
- [perpass] comments and questions for the group on… Eliot Lear
- Re: [perpass] comments and questions for the grou… Eric Burger
- Re: [perpass] comments and questions for the grou… Robin Wilton
- Re: [perpass] comments and questions for the grou… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [perpass] comments and questions for the grou… Eliot Lear
- Re: [perpass] comments and questions for the grou… Eliot Lear
- Re: [perpass] comments and questions for the grou… Eliot Lear
- Re: [perpass] comments and questions for the grou… Eliot Lear
- Re: [perpass] comments and questions for the grou… Paul Ferguson
- Re: [perpass] comments and questions for the grou… Brian E Carpenter