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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Server should not accept 1-RTT traffic before handshake completion (#3159)

Antoine Delignat-Lavaud <notifications@github.com> Wed, 30 October 2019 04:04 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Server should not accept 1-RTT traffic before handshake completion (#3159)
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> The ability to coalesce sent packets is optional and the spec goes to great pains to not require sending them at any point, which has caused much suffering for @ianswett. Moreover, I am not at all convinced that coalescing Finished solves the problem.

I agree, coalescing Finished is just a way to avoid server being blocked. The proper fix to the problem is to ensure that the client traffic secret for 1-RTT is derived from a transcript that includes client finished, as Subodh suggests. Unfortunately, only the TLS resumption master secret includes it. 



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