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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] No reading of 1-RTT before the handshake is complete (#3224)

MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com> Tue, 19 November 2019 09:59 UTC

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Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2019 01:59:44 -0800
From: MikkelFJ <notifications@github.com>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] No reading of 1-RTT before the handshake is complete (#3224)
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I know this has been discussed before - but reading the text as it is I wonder:

the text mixes three different terms, seeming arbitrarily: decryption of 1-RTT, processing of 1-RTT, and reading 1-RTT packets, and not using the 1-RTT keys at all.

I can see how packets MUST not be processed ahead of time, but I don't see why the keys cannot be used to qualify the packets. In fact the text says you can store 1-RTT packets until ready, but how do you know they are indeed 1-RTT packets if you cannot use the keys in some form?

There is a related concern about timing attacks if you do not both decrypt and verify but if that is not topic here, and if it is a concern it should probably be mentioned or referenced.

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