[quicwg/base-drafts] Can Initial/0-RTT CIDs safely be used for routing? (#2026)

Mike Bishop <notifications@github.com> Tue, 20 November 2018 19:01 UTC

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Subject: [quicwg/base-drafts] Can Initial/0-RTT CIDs safely be used for routing? (#2026)
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In Section 7.2, the spec makes an implicit assumption that the CID of the Initial packet is used for routing:
> A client SHOULD select a Destination Connection ID length long enough to fulfill the minimum for every QUIC version it supports. **This increases the chance subsequent Initial packets are routed to the same server.**

 #2008 makes this even more explicit:
> To enable consistent routing through the subsequent Initial packets are routed to the same server.	handshake, a client SHOULD select an initial Destination Connection ID length long enough to fulfill the minimum size for every QUIC version it supports.

However, in the discussion of #1486, part of the conclusion was that, to protect from malicious clients, load balancers cannot safely permit client-chosen fields to influence the routing of their packets to a particular server.  IIRC, this was also discussed in New York as part of the #1486 discussion.

Did we mean that?  If so, we have conflicting text.

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