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Re: Questions about Version Negotiation Concerning Possible Handshake Interruption

Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com> Fri, 09 February 2018 10:10 UTC

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From: Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen <mikkelfj@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 09 Feb 2018 05:10:25 -0500
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Subject: Re: Questions about Version Negotiation Concerning Possible Handshake Interruption
To: Lingmo Zhu <zlm2006@gmail.com>, "quic@ietf.org" <quic@ietf.org>
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> What if spoofing from
something like router happens?

There are integrity checks in place to protect against false packets:
https://quicwg.github.io/base-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-transport.html#version-validation

A false version negotiation packet could also just confuse and interrupt an
existing handshake, but this can also happen in other ways including
handling of retry packets. The general consensus seems to be that you
cannot really prevent on path attacks that wants to disrupt a handshake. I
believe more could be done to prevent off-path attacks, but the spec
changes frequently in this area. For example, if a stateless retry packet
does not reflect the clients connection ID, a third party could send a
retry packet which might not be accepted but could still cause a lot of
confusion, and it would be an off path attack to the extend the receivers
port and address can be guessed.

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