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Re: Questions about Version Negotiation Concerning Possible Handshake Interruption

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Fri, 09 February 2018 10:11 UTC

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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 09 Feb 2018 21:11:08 +1100
Message-ID: <CABkgnnVRn+1sNZQFB8BZc4VyzN5usLmYJ3xLo+p2uTeW_0Ji_Q@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Questions about Version Negotiation Concerning Possible Handshake Interruption
To: Lingmo Zhu <zlm2006@gmail.com>
Cc: "quic@ietf.org" <quic@ietf.org>
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Any spoofed version negotiation packet will be detected once the
handshake completes: the server is required to include its list of
supported versions in the TLS handshake.  See the link Mikkel provided
for details.

On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 8:34 PM, Lingmo Zhu <zlm2006@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi
>
> I'm new to QUIC and not sure if that could be considered but for Version
> Negotiation with the same connection ID as Initial packet, client should
> choose an acceptable version from the list. What if spoofing from something
> like router happens? Should mitigations be considered, such as adding a
> delay for validated Version Negotiation handling so that following handshake
> packets could be received later and that fake Version Negotiation could be
> ignored?
>
> Such concerning is just come out from DNS hijacking which is partially
> similar, though for QUIC it would only interrupt the handshake. I'm not sure
> but it might be used by downgrade attack in the future. Of course I'm new to
> this field so my opinion would be wrong.
>
> Thanks.
>
> Lingmo Zhu
>

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