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Questions about Version Negotiation Concerning Possible Handshake Interruption

Lingmo Zhu <zlm2006@gmail.com> Fri, 09 February 2018 09:34 UTC

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To: "quic@ietf.org" <quic@ietf.org>
From: Lingmo Zhu <zlm2006@gmail.com>
Subject: Questions about Version Negotiation Concerning Possible Handshake Interruption
Message-ID: <1d386744-c46a-842a-b172-24e290e03668@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 09 Feb 2018 17:34:29 +0800
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Hi

I'm new to QUIC and not sure if that could be considered but for Version 
Negotiation with the same connection ID as Initial packet, client should 
choose an acceptable version from the list. What if spoofing from 
something like router happens? Should mitigations be considered, such as 
adding a delay for validated Version Negotiation handling so that 
following handshake packets could be received later and that fake 
Version Negotiation could be ignored?

Such concerning is just come out from DNS hijacking which is partially 
similar, though for QUIC it would only interrupt the handshake. I'm not 
sure but it might be used by downgrade attack in the future. Of course 
I'm new to this field so my opinion would be wrong.

Thanks.

Lingmo Zhu

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