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Re: Draft response to Liaison Statement, "LS on ATSSS Phase 2Requirements to IETF QUIC Working Group"

Lars Eggert <lars@eggert.org> Wed, 30 September 2020 11:43 UTC

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From: Lars Eggert <lars@eggert.org>
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Subject: Re: Draft response to Liaison Statement, "LS on ATSSS Phase 2Requirements to IETF QUIC Working Group"
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2020 14:43:19 +0300
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Cc: QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
To: "Flinck, Hannu (Nokia - FI/Espoo)" <hannu.flinck@nokia-bell-labs.com>
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Hi,

On 2020-9-30, at 14:27, Flinck, Hannu (Nokia - FI/Espoo) <hannu.flinck@nokia-bell-labs.com> wrote:
> It seems to me that the response to Qn-2 is a too categorial.

how so? An unencrypted QUIC variant is obviously out-of-charter.

> Also the question Qn-2 in LS is not well formulated either. What they really ask is about avoidance of avoid multiple encryption layers that occur in QUIC in QUIC tunneling. The motivation for their question is also mentioned in the ATSSS-draft. And maybe the question should be answered by MASQUE WG instead.

Well, they asked us, so we are answering. And even when QUIC is tunneled in QUIC, we are not chartered to standardize a method to disable encryption for one of those QUICs.

Thanks,
Lars

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