Re: [Rats] Android comments on EAT draft

Shawn Willden <swillden@google.com> Sat, 06 July 2019 13:54 UTC

Return-Path: <swillden@google.com>
X-Original-To: rats@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: rats@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 579D01201D0 for <rats@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 6 Jul 2019 06:54:46 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -17.499
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-17.499 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_MED=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, ENV_AND_HDR_SPF_MATCH=-0.5, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL=-7.5, USER_IN_DEF_SPF_WL=-7.5] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id cRhL98TjCYDw for <rats@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 6 Jul 2019 06:54:44 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-yb1-xb2e.google.com (mail-yb1-xb2e.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::b2e]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5A9C71201CA for <rats@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 6 Jul 2019 06:54:44 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-yb1-xb2e.google.com with SMTP id x4so3115236ybk.0 for <rats@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sat, 06 Jul 2019 06:54:44 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=ESbVMRruDImOUJctdheYpQc7luSGnKBYQSFum/6PiWU=; b=lC6sCKu6ufwT0WEtBF0rQEzxAzHNQeGHPTnQu+9N3TOTixshUuhiYl+hVWw5Q6Wfbt vrXpwD2WDlWvUYEVthqja9EkxJZ0p4FerBTHSiwJnDl/+C4fvSO1u556Y2NwTe0USACy ppF8m4cmPrKoTi9xMnJAiXP2K/e1qrRxJIB/bM7OUCWfOfoYLhnF/8M5zoC+YA0xpvM7 QeZO506OvuFQkJ1nVr8X8Q22ww+FdK9QuNoMYVKPMpf5uekjBSz8Epv7xoWD1jD7TJWn ztNd2Ye6uRCgndHetbXaxmX1EvHUdOT/qlzGyOXqhPEb/94AmpcRbouZ9YbyaHsB42p3 7gkA==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=ESbVMRruDImOUJctdheYpQc7luSGnKBYQSFum/6PiWU=; b=tmfQVo41SdOT6wDRlxjAOEPfhHSi+1chSriQdLSyPfyJiqaQ8mv8tn/q8CsWxZvA+j Ml0Wqx1MXSIIg0NxRCZQ0OGspridw2KVIyuxMjaoewe9BaaDf3Tarajdbw4YwpybduUW BjRvutt5XdJWk3f5YuwgOJklOsoU8jCkbHwj/jQVIMyjLd/DfvXNo6PkCkhYyzRoP8aH nwwc5W6e29XehiIeR0HbGE/Zo/unfv6AKpqPnfe184w/hMCPN8b52fT9yP0ARmLP/oUJ 5qZNJGoP0V57D05NiSFiKGHvJiLuPrZ3rionDD4ZQZ2pSB92tNG7fYaYPK8XmXpTPtbs 27XQ==
X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUpHndvYUvExad8t7L+JZCOJOckn1PS8Mbit8zHBO5zkVtE4ZaY hoDB88v8IqDorcr+ZjyEEi5UIhoUmKKc508OG+Uh4hMDITI=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqy2t0xBQrcXWNSmO4Y8HykAtYcklfWoe/35fcucaACXPcg98m0HVk7GVfaCt4NKsGOHW/mhLhStEtHFrIqYlvU=
X-Received: by 2002:a25:1d54:: with SMTP id d81mr4982955ybd.413.1562421283011; Sat, 06 Jul 2019 06:54:43 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <CAFyqnhVJ-ps4bdhsyQDOHdzHVZsXeK7_kCDXxUVUcuyDzWS3uA@mail.gmail.com> <29657.1562351277@localhost>
In-Reply-To: <29657.1562351277@localhost>
From: Shawn Willden <swillden@google.com>
Date: Sat, 06 Jul 2019 07:54:31 -0600
Message-ID: <CAFyqnhU3KQN_Ww9km8yu7RsdJ1=6ut-bzLmFXtk00H-Zn1ykuQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
Cc: rats@ietfa.amsl.com
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000909732058d038ddb"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rats/3yA4d2ijSM6zAfEqoZoMHDQhvlE>
Subject: Re: [Rats] Android comments on EAT draft
X-BeenThere: rats@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Remote Attestation Procedures <rats.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/rats>, <mailto:rats-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/>
List-Post: <mailto:rats@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:rats-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats>, <mailto:rats-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 06 Jul 2019 13:54:47 -0000

On Fri, Jul 5, 2019 at 12:28 PM Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
wrote:

>
> Shawn Willden <swillden=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>     > Specifically, EAT is about attesting to a *device* while Keystore
>     > Attestation is about attesting to a *key* -- though we also attest to
>     > quite
>
> I have include a section in the use case document called "Cryptographic key
> Attestion"
>

Great!


>     > Another, more tractable, area of difference is that EAT provides
> Claims
>     > for
>     > several data items which Android will likely never allow to be
> attested
>     > because of their privacy implications and potential for ecosystem
>     > fragmentation (apps choosing which devices they'll run on -- we
> generally
>     > try to deny them the information they'd like to have to make those
>     > choices).  These are:
>
>     > - UEID
>     > - Origination
>     > - Location
>
> Can you say more about location?
> Are you saying that Android would never provide a relying party (say, an
> open-protocol implementation of Pokemon GO) with where a device is?
>

I strongly doubt that we will ever provide that.  I understand the
benefits, but the privacy team feels like the risks are too great, that
it's important that it always be possible to spoof privacy-critical data
elements like location.


>     > Some other claims that we have, and think are important, are OS
> version
>     > and
>     > patch-level (represented as a date, YYYYMMDD); secure boot
> verification
>     > key
>     > digest; secure boot digest (hash of all verified code); application
> ID (a
>     > digest of the requesting app signing key); and secure app version
> (hmm,
>     > don't have a patchlevel, but we should!  I'll see about adding that
> for
>     > R).
>
> These are all intended to be covered under "network attestation", but
> now I wonder if that term is mis-leading.
>

Hmm.  Yes, you're attesting to the device state, not anything about a
network.  I guess "network attestation" is because you're expecting the
relying party to be the network?


-- 
Shawn Willden | Staff Software Engineer | swillden@google.com | 720-924-6645