Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (Part 2a)
Alvaro Retana <aretana.ietf@gmail.com> Fri, 22 July 2022 12:00 UTC
Return-Path: <aretana.ietf@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: rift@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: rift@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6A0DAC16ED01; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 05:00:07 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -7.109
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.109 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE=-0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 9ow649beYM_R; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 05:00:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-lj1-x230.google.com (mail-lj1-x230.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::230]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 60F83C157B54; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 05:00:06 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-lj1-x230.google.com with SMTP id by8so5150660ljb.13; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 05:00:06 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20210112; h=from:in-reply-to:references:mime-version:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=VqLGdedlFq/JQLVS3dDFiUGNR9DE5Iw890eioznX2+o=; b=V379UnxOOoOTN0VmTgzPx3TwGCRleVYz4IW//YRJ8FNz19TJUouIiYjpA16MYQRqMD JXUFEGMS79RocUr36vDgJ/9WrjiHPoN1TFhdHkDNEHay9wDuR67XTyyb4f9e0URY/ahN ByMfHwYdtfCNK76yMjDjq9/ycT3sRWcUV8aSuHsIe2RrACP+H1j0Cm6RhJw9JKBfyeUb TBSKVugjZsdOp0wO+gKJ5FQH3ZNn0N2U2qHyVvAD8mjHPujq10QywDHyOs3+tRQ+L5S/ 83TK4eKsnUHzAkCXpn1fk95h7zHDeZEAuWQC7E1hI/nysS/Zt5rNI17r0mcZzFK/be// rGqQ==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:in-reply-to:references:mime-version:date :message-id:subject:to:cc:content-transfer-encoding; bh=VqLGdedlFq/JQLVS3dDFiUGNR9DE5Iw890eioznX2+o=; b=0WGQWIXhTApPlp2377WJMKC/OkBPxwdP0e09wDh//XuSzY2x9HpMCCSFvoUOH58kqp u3o8Ol5y1xvqlZNNTGaz29W+QfGutvfXUF/z+mWPpA4j5ygwUyJl9Wldp/VADkYpslp3 lynnZB8DYCc6HbUvdXc91caafo5R0dnVuvKm+4qGTsStNPRVkMiDceNBqBqpvEaEK/Ju 5gMij82Vmy7hEb2lj0Q6rdPzxLGMEUyWbcla/vSltji57SZG4QAze3jQ8DbXWkTH7gRa hcbq80ppBOhoc2vhNF1ceWSS9lyswI4t8G3yzYYgYXqJOMCAmmPv48YAjSjSYr/G6d4O +P8Q==
X-Gm-Message-State: AJIora/0I389xz/mZNbTo10d2q6GY7Q7+5rL7+lmC0lzUtYFBfTNrxeU K9NTnVwzQ68Q+Ra0mfaMIZyJni/ecidaOUHfdj0=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGRyM1u0Vz+6BDl8aUOPfWUpXEalZ/2nlLDPbP6DEpFBPi8U43Wb+e8NrdamyQkPehdZdGLXzjY0Vb+KF2l3d0PnLWk=
X-Received: by 2002:a2e:9991:0:b0:25d:ebb7:b8c3 with SMTP id w17-20020a2e9991000000b0025debb7b8c3mr56789lji.526.1658491203353; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 05:00:03 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from 1058052472880 named unknown by gmailapi.google.com with HTTPREST; Fri, 22 Jul 2022 05:00:02 -0700
From: Alvaro Retana <aretana.ietf@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CA+wi2hM7arcayCEh+9YN4bccp1ZB41EFK+7JijZ+TViFUWKtqQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAMMESsxBr0+UriSaTDVZMrFzU6DSiuC3-wO4+7HgX4nX7SLHmg@mail.gmail.com> <CA+wi2hPcFoGoTi=GFx9zyXeKFmM3WZi82YBX4WVjY2jYPW7Mig@mail.gmail.com> <CO1PR11MB488171455D0FD980DC4D4C39D8769@CO1PR11MB4881.namprd11.prod.outlook.com> <CAMMESsx1oCVofW1cNzr5xo60vw50P4iUEedzwQW54xKQ0zezjw@mail.gmail.com> <CA+wi2hNtSwEGHc8ySjEPTamvqJBBh7AFbbPngvjh07QJS=ttrw@mail.gmail.com> <CAMMESsxvp7MByOzoiNHWNNGNm9bp5aiUEgrhKriU7BYy=pYXLQ@mail.gmail.com> <CA+wi2hM7arcayCEh+9YN4bccp1ZB41EFK+7JijZ+TViFUWKtqQ@mail.gmail.com>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 05:00:02 -0700
Message-ID: <CAMMESsz=6HQLsQQVMW4QS_OLtnoTMgvpt3R3AXDdycTp4ig2EA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Tony Przygienda <tonysietf@gmail.com>
Cc: Jordan Head <jhead@juniper.net>, "rift-chairs@ietf.org" <rift-chairs@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-rift-rift@ietf.org, zhang.zheng@zte.com.cn, rift@ietf.org
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/rift/6xdH33giEEO1hN-NoYJ0FQN-gxU>
Subject: Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (Part 2a)
X-BeenThere: rift@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.39
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussion of Routing in Fat Trees <rift.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/rift>, <mailto:rift-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rift/>
List-Post: <mailto:rift@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:rift-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rift>, <mailto:rift-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 12:00:07 -0000
Hi! I have a couple of replies and then some comments on the updated text in -15. Thanks! Alvaro. ... > > Part 2a starts with §4.2 (Specification) and goes just through §4.2.2 -- I > > just started reading the LIE FSM/§4.2.2.1. I included a couple of comments > > on the schema itself. ... For the Chairs/Shepherd: > > - §8.1 includes a set of suggested UDP ports, but they are not reflected > > in the registry. Early allocation has not been requested -- you should > > consider doing so. See rfc7120. The same comment applies to the multicast addresses. ... > > [minor] "IPv4 Time to Live (TTL) / IPv6 Hop Limit (HL) of 1" Was GTSM > > (rfc5082) considered? Several documents (for example, rfc8085 and > > draft-ietf-opsec-v6) suggest its use. You may be asked about it later. It > > would be good to preempt those questions by adding some text in the > > Security Considerations about any risks...or using it. > > There is a religious war about 255 vs. 1 since a long time. I personally in > deployment was hurt @ least twice by implementations ending up not checking > TTL/misprocessing and forwarding one-hop packets with 254 on unicast/ > multicast. Also, having a buggy FIB looping tightly packets with TTL 255 is > seldom fun. I never saw a thing not decrementing TTL and dropping on 1. I > prefer the 1 with possibly a multi-hop spoof (never saw that in my life > frankly, such an attack is really, really hard to engineer) than a rogue > packet running away in the network or micro looping 255 times on fast links. > > What I saw were replay attacks and against those RIFT is extremely well > protected as far it's practically implementable. Plus, if one _really_ wants > security one configures adjacency keys (and RIFT allows a full plethora of > that) rather than rely on the 255 hack to have "kind of a little lick of > security". > > So if the security folks push on it we can always go to 255 or write that the > TLL received MUST be either 255 or 1 to satisfy both camps. ... > > 1500 LIEs arriving with IPv4 Time to Live (TTL) / IPv6 Hop Limit (HL) > > 1501 larger than 1 MUST be ignored. > > > > [major] "MUST be ignored" The specification of the sender (§4.2.2) says > > that "LIEs SHOULD be sent with an IPv4 Time to Live (TTL) / IPv6 Hop Limit > > (HL) of 1". This is a Normative conflict because it is only recommended to > > the sender, but required by the receiver. > > aha, yes, very good. I'm reluctant to say MUST since it's not always possible > on a platform to force TTL (this is UDP). So I make it SHOULD on both sides. > > your comment on the 255/1 stands of course. The text in -15 says: LIEs SHOULD be sent with an IPv4 Time to Live (TTL) / IPv6 Hop Limit (HL) of either 1 or 255 to prevent RIFT information reaching beyond a single L3 next-hop in the topology. ... LIEs arriving with IPv4 Time to Live (TTL) / IPv6 Hop Limit (HL) different than 1 or 255 SHOULD be ignored. The good thing is that you removed the Normative conflict: both sentences now say SHOULD. The bad thing is that, even if providing more options, anything can be used (1, 2, 4, 56, 123, 254, 255, etc.) because neither the sender nor the receiver is required to do anything. In the reply (above) you suggested using MUST. That would be a good start. But then you also said you were reluctant... Note that in my original comment I was just asking whether GTSM was considered and to justify why not (if you had considered and didn't want to use it), not to add the cumbersome support for both cases. IOW, do it any way you want, please be clear about any requirement (MUST), and justify why you're not following what other documents recommend (if not using 255) and how any issues can be mitigated (or if they need to be -- see the Security Considerations in rfc5082). > > [major] "LIEs SHOULD be sent with network control precedence." When is it > > ok to not do so? IOW, when is this behavior recommended and not required. > > BTW, please add a reference. > > hard to implement often that's why it's not MUST. will add ref to precedence. You didn't add a reference. ***** What follows are comments on -15 covering the same sections (§4.2 (Specification) through §4.2.2). ***** [Line numbers from idnits.] ... 1417 4.2. Specification ... 1423 The FSMs, as usual, are presented as states the FSM can assume, 1424 events that it can be given and according actions performed when 1425 transitioning between states on event processing. 1427 Actions are performed before the end state is assumed. [nit] Suggestion> The FSMs are presented as states a node (?) can be in, events that can take place, and resulting actions, which are performed before the next state is taken. ... 1441 Any attempt to transition from a state towards another on reception 1442 of an event where no action is specified MUST be considered an 1443 unrecoverable error, i.e. the protocol MUST reset all adjacencies, 1444 discard all the state and MAY NOT start again. [major] "MUST be considered an unrecoverable error" Given that the meaning of this phrase is explained, we don't need Normative language: s/MUST/must [major] "MAY NOT start again" "MAY NOT" is not an rfc2119 keyword. I assume you mean that the behavior is not optional (i.e. mandatory), right? s/MAY NOT/MUST NOT ... 1461 4.2.1. Transport 1463 All packet formats are defined in Thrift [thrift] models in 1464 Appendix B. LIE packet format is contained in the `LIEPacket` schema 1465 element. TIE packet format is contained in `TIEPacket`, TIDE and 1466 TIRE accordingly in `TIDEPacket`, `TIREPacket` and the whole packet 1467 is a union of the above in `ProtocolPacket` while it contains a 1468 `PacketHeader` as well. [nit] s/ and the whole packet is a union of the above in `ProtocolPacket` while it contains a `PacketHeader` as well./. The whole packet is the union of a 'PacketHeader' and the above. ... 1477 4.2.2. Link (Neighbor) Discovery (LIE Exchange) ... 1507 An implementation MAY listen and send LIEs on IPv4 and/or IPv6 1508 multicast addresses. A node MUST NOT originate LIEs on an address 1509 family if it does not process received LIEs on that family. LIEs on 1510 same link are considered part of the same LIE FSM independent of the 1511 address family they arrive on. Observe further that the LIE source 1512 address may not identify the peer uniquely in unnumbered or link- 1513 local address cases so the response transmission MUST occur over the 1514 same interface the LIEs have been received on. A node MAY use any of 1515 the adjacency's source addresses it saw in LIEs on the specific 1516 interface during adjacency formation to send TIEs (Section 4.2.3.3). 1517 That implies that an implementation MUST be ready to accept TIEs on 1518 all addresses it used as source of LIE frames. [major] "An implementation MAY listen and send LIEs on IPv4 and/or IPv6 multicast addresses." Sorry to come back to this, but it's really bothering me. After reading this multiple times I figured out what is the problem: Yes, it's optional to listen/send on IPv4 and/or IPv6 -- I too like the flexibility. *But*, for rift to work there's an expectation that at least one will be used. IOW, while the selection is flexible, selecting (at least) one AF is *not* optional (otherwise the protocol doesn't work). The "MAY" above is not a Normative statement because one AF (or both) should be used. The sentence is really just a statement of fact: any (or both) AF can be used. All this is to suggest this change: s/MAY/may [major] "MAY use any of the adjacency's source addresses it saw in LIEs...to send TIEs." This use of "MAY" makes using the source address from a LIE optional. §4.2.3.3 says that "TIEs...using the destination address on which the LIE adjacency has been formed", which doesn't make the use optional. I'm also revisiting this -- again, statement of fact, not an option: s/MAY/may 1520 A simplified version on platforms with limited multicast support MAY 1521 implement optional sending and reception of LIE frames on IPv4 subnet 1522 broadcast addresses and IPv6 all routers multicast address though 1523 such technique is less optimal and presents a wider attack surface 1524 from security perspective. [major] Ahhh...mmmm... Let's start with this: I'm not sure how to read this sentence, a few commas would help. You don't need to solve all the cases. What is "limited multicast support"? As I interpret the sentence, IPv6 seems to support multicast so the choice is simple: use IPv6. As you explain, the node doesn't have to use both. The phrase "MAY implement optional..." is a double indication that "sending and reception" is optional: you don't have to. Which seems to point to the obvious conclusion of use IPv6. In summary, I don't understand the value of this sentence, including the use of a normative MAY ... but maybe I just don't understand the sentence itself. :-( 1526 A ThreeWay adjacency (as defined in the glossary) over any address 1527 family implies support for IPv4 forwarding if the 1528 `ipv4_forwarding_capable` flag in `LinkCapabilities` is set to true. 1529 A node, in case of absence of IPv4 addresses on such links and 1530 advertising `ipv4_forwarding_capable` as true, MUST forward IPv4 1531 packets using gateways discovered on IPv6-only links advertising this 1532 capability. It is expected that the whole fabric supports the same 1533 type of forwarding of address families on all the links, any other 1534 combination is outside the scope of this specification. 1535 `ipv4_forwarding_capable` MUST be set to true when LIEs from a IPv4 1536 address are sent and MAY be set to true in LIEs on IPv6 address if no 1537 LIEs are sent from a IPv4 address. If IPv4 and IPv6 LIEs indicate 1538 contradicting information protocol behavior is unspecified. [major] "absence of IPv4 addresses...and advertising `ipv4_forwarding_capable`...MUST forward IPv4 packets using gateways discovered on IPv6-only links" Just to be clear, the choice of which AF to use when sending LIEs is up to the nodes -- which then means that nodes may decide (or be configured) to only use IPv6 with RIFT, even if IPv4 is configured on the interface. Right? I assume that's true because it is the third case shown in Table 1. IOW, not having IPv4 configured ("absence of IPv4 addresses") is not the only case where ipv4_forwarding_capable can be set, and also not the only case where the interface will support v4overv6. This will also happen if the LIEs/TIEs are only advertised over IPv6 (regardless of which AFs are supported/configured on the interface). The sentence above is then misleading because it mandates the v4overv6 behavior only in the "absence of IPv4 addresses". [major] "MUST forward IPv4 packets using gateways discovered on IPv6-only links" I assume that this means that the IPv4 packet is encapsulated in IPv6 and sent to a link-local address -- is that what you mean? Using "gateways discovered" may give the impression that there's more involved. You may want to consider being explicit about the operation. Also, in Figure 1 the text (for the 3rd case: IPv4/IPv6 over IPv6) simply says "IPv4 is forwarded", giving the wrong impression that the IPv4 is natively (not encapsulated) forwarded. At some point we talked about the fact that forwarding is out of scope -- that's ok. I'm calling out this text because it requires forwarding ("MUST forward"). Please make the behavior non-normative and declare the specific mechanism to "forward IPv4 packets...on IPv6-only links" out of scope. [minor] s/`ipv4_forwarding_capable` MUST be set to true when LIEs from a IPv4 address are sent and MAY be set to true in LIEs on IPv6 address if no LIEs are sent from a IPv4 address./If IPv4 forwarding is supported on an interface, `ipv4_forwarding_capable` MUST be set to true when LIEs from a IPv4 address are sent and MAY be set to true in LIEs on IPv6 address if no LIEs are sent from a IPv4 address. [nit] s/information protocol/information, protocol 1540 Operation of a fabric where only some of the links are supporting 1541 forwarding on an address family or have an address in a family and 1542 others do not is outside the scope of this specification. [] I think it's ok to leave the operation of the fabric out of scope, but the ability to forward IPv4 traffic without having it configured means that there are some operational aspects that are left out, and which are not clearly specified anywhere else (as in not even in other specifications). For example, take a look at §3/rfc9229 (IPv4 Routes with an IPv6 Next Hop in the Babel Routing Protocol). The intent is not to compare, just to point out a recent example of something similar which resulted in significant discussion during IESG Evaluation. I don't expect any action, just something to keep in mind if it comes up later. ... 1550 +=======+=======+=============================================+ 1551 | AF | AF | Behavior | 1552 +=======+=======+=============================================+ 1553 | IPv4 | IPv4 | LIEs and TIEs are exchanged over IPv4, no | 1554 | | | IPv6 forwarding. TIEs are received on any | 1555 | | | of the LIE sending addresses. | 1556 +-------+-------+---------------------------------------------+ 1557 | IPv6 | IPv6 | LIEs and TIEs are exchanged over IPv6 only, | 1558 | | | no IPv4 forwarding if either of the | 1559 | | | `ipv4_forwarding_capable` flags is false. | 1560 | | | If both `ipv4_forwarding_capable` flags are | 1561 | | | true IPv4 is forwarded. TIEs are received | 1562 | | | on any of the LIE sending addresses. | 1563 +-------+-------+---------------------------------------------+ 1564 | IPv4, | IPv6 | LIEs and TIEs are exchanged over IPv6, no | 1565 | IPv6 | | IPv4 forwarding if either of the | 1566 | | | `ipv4_forwarding_capable` flags is false. | 1567 | | | If both `ipv4_forwarding_capable` are true | 1568 | | | IPv4 is forwarded. TIEs are received on | 1569 | | | any of the IPv6 LIE sending addresses. | 1570 +-------+-------+---------------------------------------------+ 1571 | IPv4, | IPv4, | LIEs and TIEs are exchanged over IPv6 and | 1572 | IPv6 | IPv6 | IPv4, unspecified behavior if either of the | 1573 | | | `ipv4_forwarding_capable` flags is false or | 1574 | | | IPv4 and IPv6 advertise different flags as | 1575 | | | described previously. IPv4 and IPv6 are | 1576 | | | forwarded. TIEs are received on any of the | 1577 | | | IPv4 and IPv6 LIE sending addresses. | 1578 +-------+-------+---------------------------------------------+ [minor] Two of the columns have an "AF" header. It is not clear (just from the header) how their meaning is different. Please clarify. I'm assuming that the first column shows the AFs enabled on the interface, and the second one shows the AF used to exchange TIEs/LIEs. Or does the first column represent which AFs are intended to be forwarded (to cover the "absence of IPv4 addresses")? In either case, it looks like the table may be incomplete. [minor] The Behavior of the second and third cases is the same, which adds to my question about what the AF columns mean. Are the columns representing only one side? [nit] Case 4: "IPv4 and IPv6 are forwarded." The placement of this sentence after the behavior of ipv4_forwarding_capable is explained (again) gives the impression that IPv4 and IPv6 are always forwarded. [minor] Related question, so I don't forget later. In Case 2 (IPv6/IPv6), for example, if only one side sets ipv4_forwarding_capable, I'm assuming the TIEs won't include any IPv4 information. Is that true? Where is that specified? It seems obvious, but it would be nice if it was explicitly specified somewhere. ... 1608 A node MUST form a ThreeWay adjacency (or in other words consider the 1609 neighbor "valid" and hence reflecting it) if and only if the 1610 following first order logic conditions are satisfied on a LIE packet 1611 as specified by the `LIEPacket` schema element and received on a link [] -12 (the last version I had looked at) listed a couple of conditions related to the PoDs: A node tries to form a three-way adjacency if and only if 1. the node is in the same PoD or either the node or the neighbor advertises "undefined/any" PoD membership (PoD# = 0) AND ... 3. the neighbor is not member of some PoD while the node has a northbound adjacency already joining another PoD AND Are these conditions not needed any more? I know they were taken off because I was confused with them -- but I guess that the text (in -12) about how they could be "optionally disregarded" made them not required. Just checking... ... 1616 2. the neighboring node uses a valid System ID (i.e. value different 1617 from `IllegalSystemID`) in `sender` element in `PacketHeader` 1618 *and* [nit] s/in `sender` element/in the `sender` element 1620 3. the neighboring node uses a different System ID than the node 1621 itself [nit] For consistency, looks like you're missing an "*and*". 1623 4. the advertised MTUs in `LiePacket` element match on both sides 1624 *and* [major] This clause talks about the "advertised MTUs", but advertising the MTU is optional. Suggestion> the MTU on on the link (either advertised in the `LiePacket` element or the 'default_mtu_size') matches on both sides *and* [EoR P2a-15]
- [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (Part… Alvaro Retana
- [Rift] Fwd: Re: AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Antoni Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Tony Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Tony Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Pascal Thubert (pthubert)
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Pascal Thubert (pthubert)
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Tony Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Jordan Head
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Jordan Head
- [Rift] RIFT UDP Ports/Multicast Address Allocatio… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [Rift] RIFT UDP Ports/Multicast Address Alloc… Antoni Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Antoni Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Alvaro Retana
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Antoni Przygienda
- Re: [Rift] AD Review of draft-ietf-rift-rift-12 (… Jordan Head